The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents¶
Roth, A. E. (1984). The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: A case study in game theory. Journal of Political Economy, 92(6), 991-1016.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Primes¶
- Two-Sided Matching
- Economics & market design: Labor markets (the National Resident Matching Program assigning graduating doctors to residency positions), school choice (centralized assignment of students to public schools), and entry-level professional markets are designed as deferred-acceptance mechanisms that produce stable matchings.
This sourceShows that the National Resident Matching Program implements a deferred-acceptance mechanism producing a stable matching, the model later generalized to centralized school-choice systems.
- Economics & market design: Labor markets (the National Resident Matching Program assigning graduating doctors to residency positions), school choice (centralized assignment of students to public schools), and entry-level professional markets are designed as deferred-acceptance mechanisms that produce stable matchings.
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