Bayesian Persuasion¶
Kamenica, E., & Gentzkow, M. (2011). Bayesian Persuasion. American Economic Review.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Domain-specific¶
- Bayesian Persuasion
- Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011)
This sourceThe originating paper that defines Bayesian persuasion as a sender committing to a signal that a Bayesian receiver updates on before acting. The concavification result: the value of an optimal signal is the concave closure of the sender's value function evaluated at the prior. The source of the prosecutor-and-judge example that illustrates Bayesian persuasion. The prosecutor example's result that a committed coarse investigation raises the conviction rate from 30 percent under full disclosure to 60 percent.
SupportedVerified against the source
- Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011)
Verification¶
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