Self-Interest, Automaticity, and the Psychology of Conflict of Interest¶
Moore, D. A., & Loewenstein, G. (2004). Self-Interest, Automaticity, and the Psychology of Conflict of Interest. Social Justice Research, 17(2), 189-202.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Conflict of Interest
- Moore and Loewenstein (2004) emphasize that self-interested judgment operates automatically and unconsciously, so even sincere actors will systematically discount diffuse harms while attending to concentrated personal gains.
This sourceArgues self-interest is automatic and largely unconscious while obligation to others requires deliberate effort, so conflicts produce systematic bias even among sincere actors. Live-verified (Springer).
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
The abstract states outright that self-interest is automatic, often unconscious, and clouds judgment of one's obligations to others, supporting the automaticity half of the sentence but not the diffuse-harms vs concentrated-gains asymmetry.
“Self-interest is automatic, viscerally compelling, and often unconscious. Understanding one's ethical and professional obligations to others, in contrast, often involves a more thoughtful process. The automatic nature of self-interest gives it a primal power to influence judgment and make it difficult for people to understand its influence on their judgment, let alone eradicate its influence.”
- Moore and Loewenstein (2004) emphasize that self-interested judgment operates automatically and unconsciously, so even sincere actors will systematically discount diffuse harms while attending to concentrated personal gains.
- Motivated Reasoning
- Institutional settings with explicit epistemic duties are its most legible hosts, precisely because they write down the standard the asymmetry then departs from.
This sourceArgues that self-interest bends professional judgement automatically and outside awareness wherever a role carrying an explicit duty also leaves the judgement discretionary.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
The abstract supports the underlying mechanism—self-interest biases judgement automatically and unnoticed, while duties to others are deliberate—not that explicit-duty institutions are its most legible hosts.
“Understanding one's ethical and professional obligations to others, in contrast, often involves a more thoughtful process.”
- Institutional settings with explicit epistemic duties are its most legible hosts, precisely because they write down the standard the asymmetry then departs from.
Verification¶
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Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 2 of 2 citations: 2 supported in part. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.
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