Theories of Bank Behavior under Capital Regulation¶
VanHoose, D. (2007). Theories of Bank Behavior under Capital Regulation. Journal of Banking & Finance, 31(12), 3680-3697.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Primes¶
- Peltzman Effect
- The intervention the prime names is exactly what prudential regulation does — tie the cost-of-failure back to the agent's own wallet: capital-at-risk requirements, executive clawbacks, and risk-weighted capital leave the bank residual exposure so its re-optimization stops short.
This sourceReviews how capital-at-risk requirements leave banks residual exposure and thereby curb the moral hazard created by guarantees — the prudential-regulation remedy.
- The intervention the prime names is exactly what prudential regulation does — tie the cost-of-failure back to the agent's own wallet: capital-at-risk requirements, executive clawbacks, and risk-weighted capital leave the bank residual exposure so its re-optimization stops short.
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