Theories of Bank Behavior under Capital Regulation

VanHoose, D. (2007). Theories of Bank Behavior under Capital Regulation. Journal of Banking & Finance, 31(12), 3680-3697.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

2007

DOI

10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.01.006

Link

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.01.006

Cited from

systems_cybernetics

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Peltzman Effect
  • The intervention the prime names is exactly what prudential regulation does — tie the cost-of-failure back to the agent's own wallet: capital-at-risk requirements, executive clawbacks, and risk-weighted capital leave the bank residual exposure so its re-optimization stops short.

    This sourceReviews how capital-at-risk requirements leave banks residual exposure and thereby curb the moral hazard created by guarantees — the prudential-regulation remedy.

Verification

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Registry ID ref:e91bb3aa6e9b · see in the full table