On the Foundations of Quantitative Information Flow.¶
Smith, G. (2009). On the Foundations of Quantitative Information Flow. Foundations of Software Science and Computational Structures (FoSSaCS 2009).
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Primes¶
- Side Channel Attack
- Reasoning about a system side-channel-wise licenses several moves the access-control frame does not. Threat-model expansion presumes the adversary measures everything cheap to measure, not only what was explicitly designated as output. Information-flow accounting tracks data dependencies on secret variables through every observable, not just declared outputs — constant-time programming being the discipline of refusing data-dependent branches or memory accesses. Channel-capacity bounding recognizes that even when leakage cannot be eliminated, its bandwidth can be bounded, so a one-bit-per-hour channel may be acceptable where a one-megabit-per-second channel is not.
This sourceEstablishes a min-entropy-based measure of how many bits a system leaks about a secret — the quantitative-information-flow basis for bounding side-channel capacity rather than assuming leakage is zero.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
Smith 2009 gives the quantitative-information-flow basis — leakage measured in bits via min-entropy — for bounding channel capacity, but not the one-bit-per-hour acceptability judgment.
“We then explore an alternative foundation based on a concept of vulnerability (closely related to Bayes risk ) and which measures uncertainty using Rényi’s min-entropy , rather than Shannon entropy.”
- Reasoning about a system side-channel-wise licenses several moves the access-control frame does not. Threat-model expansion presumes the adversary measures everything cheap to measure, not only what was explicitly designated as output. Information-flow accounting tracks data dependencies on secret variables through every observable, not just declared outputs — constant-time programming being the discipline of refusing data-dependent branches or memory accesses. Channel-capacity bounding recognizes that even when leakage cannot be eliminated, its bandwidth can be bounded, so a one-bit-per-hour channel may be acceptable where a one-megabit-per-second channel is not.
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