Multipart Pricing of Public Goods.¶
Clarke, E. H. (1971). Multipart Pricing of Public Goods. Public Choice, 11(1), 17-33.
Cited by¶
4 citations across 4 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Incentive Compatibility
- The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism — Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971)
This sourceDeveloped the Clarke mechanism, a component of the VCG family.
- The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism — Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971)
- Mechanism Design
- VCG mechanisms (named for Vickrey 1961, Clarke 1971, Groves 1973
This sourceDeveloped the Clarke mechanism, a component of the VCG family.
- VCG mechanisms (named for Vickrey 1961, Clarke 1971, Groves 1973
Domain-specific¶
Mechanisms¶
- Truthful Auction Mechanism
- The generalization of this rule to many goods is the same idea: charge each winner the cost their presence imposes on everyone else.
This sourceGeneralizes truthful allocation by charging each winner for the external cost their participation imposes on others.
- The generalization of this rule to many goods is the same idea: charge each winner the cost their presence imposes on everyone else.
Verification¶
Does it exist? Confirmed. This work's DOI resolves to a registered record, which fixes its identity. That is all it fixes.
Does it back the claim? Not recorded. Neither this nor any other of the 4 citations of this work carries a recorded support check.
Was it audited? Yes. A second, independent pass read the citation against the article text and recorded a verdict.
Support is checked per citation rather than per work — the same source can be cited soundly in one article and wrongly in another. Per-citation recording began recently, so a citation with no recorded check is a gap in the record rather than evidence it went unchecked.
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Registry ID ref:e9d4f6fa9586 · see in the full table