The holdout problem, urban sprawl, and eminent domain.

Miceli, T. J., & Sirmans, C. F. (2007). The holdout problem, urban sprawl, and eminent domain. Journal of Housing Economics, 16(3), 3-4.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

2007

DOI

10.1016/j.jhe.2007.06.004

Link

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhe.2007.06.004

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Anti-Commons Tragedy
  • In real-estate assembly a developer must buy parcels from many separate owners, any of whom can block or capture the surplus — the classic motivation for eminent-domain takings.

    This sourceModels land-assembly holdout — each owner of a needed parcel can block the project or extract surplus — and analyzes eminent domain as the response to fragmented parcel ownership.

Mechanisms

• Phased Buyout or Transfer Program
  • A single owner refusing to sell can block assembly and leave a checkerboard of vacated and occupied lots that serves no one — the hold-out problem in its purest form.

    This sourceIdentifies strategic holdout in land assembly as a development problem associated with dispersed ownership.

Verification

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