The holdout problem, urban sprawl, and eminent domain.¶
Miceli, T. J., & Sirmans, C. F. (2007). The holdout problem, urban sprawl, and eminent domain. Journal of Housing Economics, 16(3), 3-4.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Anti-Commons Tragedy
- In real-estate assembly a developer must buy parcels from many separate owners, any of whom can block or capture the surplus — the classic motivation for eminent-domain takings.
This sourceModels land-assembly holdout — each owner of a needed parcel can block the project or extract surplus — and analyzes eminent domain as the response to fragmented parcel ownership.
- In real-estate assembly a developer must buy parcels from many separate owners, any of whom can block or capture the surplus — the classic motivation for eminent-domain takings.
Mechanisms¶
- Phased Buyout or Transfer Program
- A single owner refusing to sell can block assembly and leave a checkerboard of vacated and occupied lots that serves no one — the hold-out problem in its purest form.
This sourceIdentifies strategic holdout in land assembly as a development problem associated with dispersed ownership.
- A single owner refusing to sell can block assembly and leave a checkerboard of vacated and occupied lots that serves no one — the hold-out problem in its purest form.
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