Spectre Attacks¶
Kocher, P., Horn, J., Fogh, A., Genkin, D., Gruss, D., Haas, W., Hamburg, M., et al. (2019). Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution. Proceedings of the 40th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P), 1-19.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Side Channel Attack
- In software security it is speculative-execution attacks reading across isolation boundaries via cache footprints, MAC-verification timing leaking plaintext, and blind injection inferring schema from response-time differentials.
This sourceSpeculative-execution attack reading across isolation boundaries via cache-footprint side channels.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
Spectre supports the speculative-execution, cache-footprint, cross-isolation-boundary example; it says nothing about MAC-verification timing or blind injection.
“In addition to violating process isolation boundaries using native code, Spectre attacks can also be used to violate sandboxing”
- In software security it is speculative-execution attacks reading across isolation boundaries via cache footprints, MAC-verification timing leaking plaintext, and blind injection inferring schema from response-time differentials.
Verification¶
Does it exist? Confirmed. This work's DOI resolves to a registered record, which fixes its identity. That is all it fixes.
Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 1 of 1 citation: 1 supported in part. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.
Support is checked per citation rather than per work — the same source can be cited soundly in one article and wrongly in another. Per-citation recording began recently, so a citation with no recorded check is a gap in the record rather than evidence it went unchecked.
See how references were verified.
Registry ID ref:ea6a31b5a079 · see in the full table