Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix

Condorcet, M. d. (1785). Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix.

Type

Book

Intellectual base

Review or monograph

Year

1785

Link

https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/essai-sur-lapplication-de-lanalyse-a-la-probabilite-des-decisions-rendues-a-la-pluralite-des-voix/7CE09845E26E8A4E240DE6E947114FAA

Cited from

economics_finance, information_theory

Cited by

4 citations across 4 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Rock-Paper-Scissors (Intransitive Cyclic Dominance)
  • In social choice, Condorcet's voting paradox shows that majorities can prefer A over B, B over C, and C over A, so no Condorcet winner exists even when every individual is rational.
• Social Choice
  • The Condorcet jury theorem transferred into the theoretical foundation of ensemble methods, where the voters are weak classifiers.

    This sourceIntroduces the Condorcet jury theorem (independent better-than-chance voters aggregate toward correctness — the foundation later imported into ensemble methods) and the voting (Condorcet) cycle.

• Wisdom of the Crowds
  • The structural insight is robust: a market price, a jury verdict, a Random Forest's prediction, a pooled forecast, and a perceptual readout from a noisy neural population all exhibit the same logic, as Condorcet's (1785) jury theorem first proved for majority votes of independently informed voters, where the probability of a correct collective verdict rises toward certainty as the group grows, provided each voter is better than chance and votes independently.

    This sourceImprimerie Royale. Proves that the probability of a correct majority decision rises toward certainty as the number of independent, better-than-chance voters increases — the founding formal result for aggregation in collective decision.

Mechanisms

• Pairwise Comparison Protocol
  • Its signature failure mode is intransitivity — A beats B, B beats C, and C beats A — which produces a Condorcet cycle that no single ranking can honestly represent.

    This sourceShows that pairwise majority comparisons can be intransitive, producing an A-over-B, B-over-C, C-over-A cycle that has no consistent single ranking.

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Links previously used in the corpus

Before the registry existed this work was also linked 1 other way.

• https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k417181 ×2

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