A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium

Hart, S., & Mas-Colell, A. (2000). A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium. Econometrica, 68(5), 1127-1150.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

2000

Link

https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00153matched

Cited from

information_theory

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Regret
  • A policymaker uncertain over future states, like a bandit algorithm uncertain over arm rewards, can adopt rules that guarantee bounded shortfall against the best fixed policy in hindsight, importing the no-regret machinery wholesale.

    This sourceEstablishes that regret-matching (no-regret) dynamics converge to correlated equilibrium, the result tying cumulative-regret bounding to robust repeated-play policy design.

Domain-specific

• Swap regret
  • The entry records a descriptive analytical identity; practical use requires the governing domain's evidence, standards, and safety obligations.

Verification

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Registry ID ref:ea978641f998 · see in the full table