Five rules for the evolution of cooperation

Nowak, M. A. (2006). Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science, 314(5805), 1560-1563.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

2006

DOI

10.1126/science.1133755

Link

https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1133755

Cited from

economics_finance, information_theory

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Cooperation
  • A diplomat analyzing treaty compliance, a biologist studying mutualism, and an engineer designing a peer-to-peer protocol can all reduce their problem to the same two questions, and can borrow solutions across the boundary.

    This sourceSynthesizes the finite stabilizer menu — kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity (reputation), network reciprocity, group selection — each a benefit-to-cost condition, supporting inferences about cooperation across kin groups vs strangers and across scale.

• Social Dilemma
  • Cheating (taking the benefit of a partner's cooperation without paying the cost) pays the individual, yet populations of cooperators outcompete populations of defectors; the puzzle is resolved through repetition, kinship, reputation, and partner choice, a research program Nowak (2006) organized into five recurring rules for the emergence of cooperation.

    This sourceSynthesizes the finite menu of stabilizing mechanisms—kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity (reputation), network reciprocity, and group selection—each reducible to a benefit-to-cost condition, supporting inferences about when cooperation is stable across kin groups versus interactions among strangers.

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