Theory and Practice in the Design of Physician Payment Incentives.¶
Robinson, J. C. (2001). Theory and Practice in the Design of Physician Payment Incentives. Milbank Quarterly, 79(2), 149-177.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Risk Transfer
- In healthcare financing, capitation contracts transfer cost risk from payers to provider organizations, with reinsurance protecting the tail.
This sourceAnalyzes capitation as transfer of cost risk from payers to provider organizations and the adverse-selection and stop-loss responses.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
The abstract places capitation among physician-payment methods analysed under risk aversion and imperfect information, but never states the risk transfer to provider organizations or any reinsurance role.
“Fee‐for‐service and capitation are flawed methods of motivating physicians to achieve specific goals.”
- In healthcare financing, capitation contracts transfer cost risk from payers to provider organizations, with reinsurance protecting the tail.
Verification¶
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