Republic¶
Plato. (1992). Republic. Hackett Publishing.
Cited by¶
5 citations across 5 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Dialectic
- Dialectic is a method of reasoning and inquiry by the multiple-interlocutor exchange
This sourcePresents dialectic as the highest study, advancing the philosopher beyond doxa to knowledge of the Forms and the Good through structured multi-voice question-and-answer; supports the multiple-interlocutor-exchange commitment (180).
- Dialectic is a method of reasoning and inquiry by the multiple-interlocutor exchange
- Ontology
This sourcePlato theory of Forms foundational realism.
Domain-specific¶
- Diegesis
- The term descends from the Greek for "narration" and entered modern narratological usage through Plato's distinction between diegesis (a narrator reporting what characters say and do) and mimesis (direct enactment)
This sourcePlato's division of lexis in Republic III into simple narration and narration by imitation, the passage from which the diegesis/mimesis terminology descends.
Supported in partVerified against a saved copy of the source
“And narration may be either simple narration, or imitation, or a union of the two?”
- The term descends from the Greek for "narration" and entered modern narratological usage through Plato's distinction between diegesis (a narrator reporting what characters say and do) and mimesis (direct enactment)
- Fallacy of Accident
- The defining instance descends from Plato's Republic Book I, where Cephalus proposes that justice is telling the truth and returning what one has borrowed
This sourceIn Book I Socrates sums up Cephalus's view of justice as telling the truth and returning what one has received, and answers it with the case of weapons reclaimed by a friend who has gone mad.
SupportedVerified against the source
- The defining instance descends from Plato's Republic Book I, where Cephalus proposes that justice is telling the truth and returning what one has borrowed
- Moral impunity test
- Glaucon imagines a wearer who can act beyond ordinary observation and uses the story to challenge the value of justice apart from reputation and penalty.
This sourcePrimary text checked against the Perseus indexed Book II passage and Project Gutenberg's Benjamin Jowett translation, Books II and X. Book II supplies Glaucon's shepherd, ring, queen-assisted conspiracy and two-ring challenge; Book X supplies Socrates' later answer. One translation calls the wearer an ancestor of Gyges, while Jowett calls him Gyges; neither establishes a historical owner of such a ring. These are philosophical passages, not observed behavior.
- Glaucon imagines a wearer who can act beyond ordinary observation and uses the story to challenge the value of justice apart from reputation and penalty.
Verification¶
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Links previously used in the corpus¶
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