Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments.¶
Forsythe, R., Horowitz, J. L., Savin, N. E., & Sefton, M. (1994). Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments. Games and Economic Behavior, 6(3), 347-369.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Other-Regarding Preferences
- The dictator game makes this concrete: a proposer given an endowment unilaterally decides how much to transfer to an anonymous recipient with no power to accept, retaliate, or reciprocate, and the own-payoff-only prediction is zero
This sourceEstablishes the dictator game and its nonzero giving against the own-payoff-only zero-transfer prediction.
- The dictator game makes this concrete: a proposer given an endowment unilaterally decides how much to transfer to an anonymous recipient with no power to accept, retaliate, or reciprocate, and the own-payoff-only prediction is zero
Domain-specific¶
- Dictator Game
- The standard protocol, established as a control for the ultimatum game (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, and Sefton, 1994, building on an earlier version by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler)
This sourceIntroduces the dictator game as the no-punishment control against which ultimatum-game generosity is read, and reports its allocation distribution.
- The standard protocol, established as a control for the ultimatum game (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, and Sefton, 1994, building on an earlier version by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler)
Verification¶
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Registry ID ref:ec9cacde1fa9 · see in the full table