Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information¶
Bebchuk, L. A. (1984). Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information. RAND Journal of Economics, 15(3), 404-415.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Primes¶
- War Of Attrition
- In law, patent and tort suits in which the prize is the settlement and the per-period cost is legal fees instantiate the structure, and the "deep pocket" advantage is exactly the asymmetric-endowment version of the equilibrium.
This sourceModels litigation as a costly contest over settlement under asymmetric information, formalizing the asymmetric-resource (deep-pocket) advantage.
- In law, patent and tort suits in which the prize is the settlement and the per-period cost is legal fees instantiate the structure, and the "deep pocket" advantage is exactly the asymmetric-endowment version of the equilibrium.
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