The Bargaining Problem¶
Nash, J. F. (1950). The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica, 18(2), 155-162.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
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Primes¶
- Bargaining Power
- Bargaining power is a relational advantage that lets one party move the terms of an exchange toward itself because failing to reach agreement costs it less than it costs the other side.
This sourceEstablishes the disagreement point and the individual-rationality constraint that bound an attainable division of joint surplus, so each party's fallback sets a floor beneath which it will not settle and improving that fallback shifts the solution toward it.
- Bargaining power is a relational advantage that lets one party move the terms of an exchange toward itself because failing to reach agreement costs it less than it costs the other side.
- Conditional Access
- The reasoning also predicts a substrate-independent counter-strategy: outside options break the leverage, which is why competition law, legal-aid provision, multilateral coalitions, and unbundling mandates all fall in the same family of structural countermeasures despite operating in different domains.
This sourceFoundational bargaining theory in which acceptance is governed by comparison of a proposed agreement's value against each party's outside option (disagreement point).
- The reasoning also predicts a substrate-independent counter-strategy: outside options break the leverage, which is why competition law, legal-aid provision, multilateral coalitions, and unbundling mandates all fall in the same family of structural countermeasures despite operating in different domains.
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