Political control versus expertise

Bawn, K. (1995). Political control versus expertise: Congressional choices about administrative procedures. American Political Science Review, 89(1), 62-73.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1995

DOI

10.2307/2082797

Link

https://doi.org/10.2307/2082797

Cited from

military_strategic_studies

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Authority Delegation Under Uncertainty
  • Authority Delegation Under Uncertainty invites reasoning about when pre-positioned authority is necessary (high-speed, high-stakes, genuinely uncertain) vs. when specification and approval are feasible (slow-burn, lower-stakes, well-defined scenarios), a tradeoff Bawn (1995) modeled as the choice between political control and technical expertise when crafting bureaucratic discretion.

    This sourceModels the legislative tradeoff between political control and agency expertise, showing broader delegation is rational when contingencies are technically complex

Verification

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