Can Catch Shares Prevent Fisheries Collapse?¶
Costello, C., Gaines, S. D., & Lynham, J. (2008). Can Catch Shares Prevent Fisheries Collapse?. Science, 321(5896), 1678-1681.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Rate Limiting
- In environmental policy it is fishing quotas per vessel per season, water-extraction permits per period, and emission caps per facility per year — the rate-limit pattern applied to commons.
This sourceShows individual transferable quotas — per-vessel catch limits per season requiring strong identification (registration, catch reporting) — applied as the rate-limit pattern on a commons.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
The abstract supports rights-based catch shares (quotas) as a fisheries-commons regime, but does not state per-vessel/per-season quotas, water-extraction permits, or emission caps.
“Bioeconomic theory and case studies suggest that rights-based catch shares can provide individual incentives for sustainable harvest that is less prone to collapse.”
- In environmental policy it is fishing quotas per vessel per season, water-extraction permits per period, and emission caps per facility per year — the rate-limit pattern applied to commons.
Verification¶
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Registry ID ref:ef64dd554992 · see in the full table