Algorithmic Attention Rents¶
O’Reilly, T., Strauss, I., & Mazzucato, M. (2024). Algorithmic Attention Rents: A Theory of Digital Platform Market Power. Data & Policy.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Monopoly
- In information and attention it is the dominant search engine, news channel, or scholarly database whose users have no equivalent alternative.
This sourceDocuments single-controller dynamics in information and attention markets — dominant aggregator platforms extracting rents through algorithmic control over user attention, the gatekeeping-and-rent-capture structure in information access.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
The paper describes dominant search and other platforms as attention gatekeepers whose users do not leave, but does not name news channels or scholarly databases or say users have no equivalent alternative.
“the market leaders are sufficiently far enough ahead of the competition that, once they have established market power, they have headroom to worsen the product in other ways without losing users to competitors.”
- In information and attention it is the dominant search engine, news channel, or scholarly database whose users have no equivalent alternative.
Verification¶
Does it exist? Confirmed. This work's DOI resolves to a registered record, which fixes its identity. That is all it fixes.
Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 1 of 1 citation: 1 supported in part. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.
Support is checked per citation rather than per work — the same source can be cited soundly in one article and wrongly in another. Per-citation recording began recently, so a citation with no recorded check is a gap in the record rather than evidence it went unchecked.
See how references were verified.
Registry ID ref:ef701c58e162 · see in the full table