Algorithmic Attention Rents¶
O’Reilly, T., Strauss, I., & Mazzucato, M. (2024). Algorithmic Attention Rents: A Theory of Digital Platform Market Power. Data & Policy.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Monopoly
- In information and attention it is the dominant search engine, news channel, or scholarly database whose users have no equivalent alternative.
This sourceDocuments single-controller dynamics in information and attention markets — dominant aggregator platforms extracting rents through algorithmic control over user attention, the gatekeeping-and-rent-capture structure in information access.
- In information and attention it is the dominant search engine, news channel, or scholarly database whose users have no equivalent alternative.
Verification¶
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Registry ID ref:ef701c58e162 · see in the full table