A Value for n-Person Games

Shapley, L. S. (1953). A Value for n-Person Games. Contributions to the Theory of Games II.

Type

Book chapter

Intellectual base

Review or monograph

Year

1953

Pages cited

307-317

DOI

10.1515/9781400881970-018

ISBN

9781400881970

DOI registrant

Princeton University Press

Link

https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400829156-012

Cited by

3 citations across 3 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Domain-specific

• Imputation (Game Theory)
  • The core adds resistance to deviations by every coalition; the Shapley value applies marginal-contribution axioms;

Mechanisms

• Blame–Credit Apportionment Table
  • The principled ideal for dividing shared credit is the Shapley value

    This sourceIntroduces a principled cooperative-game allocation whose value for each participant equals the average marginal contribution over all joining orders.

• Contribution Net-Value Review
  • The discipline that keeps it honest is to score marginal contribution against the whole

    This sourceDefines a player's value from its marginal contributions across coalitions of the whole game.

Verification

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Does it back the claim? Not recorded. Neither this nor any other of the 3 citations of this work carries a recorded support check.

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Links previously used in the corpus

Before the registry existed this work was also linked 1 other way.

• https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400881970-018 ×1

Registry ID ref:effaf444b922 · see in the full table