Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage¶
Lundberg, S., & Pollak, R. A. (1996). Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(4), 139-158.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Primes¶
- Relationship Specific Investment
- In family and household economics, a spouse who takes the home-and-children track invests in an asset whose value is highest in this marriage and lower outside it.
This sourceAnalyzes marriage-specific investment and its bargaining and hold-up consequences in household economics.
- In family and household economics, a spouse who takes the home-and-children track invests in an asset whose value is highest in this marriage and lower outside it.
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