Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage

Lundberg, S., & Pollak, R. A. (1996). Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(4), 139-158.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1996

DOI

10.1257/jep.10.4.139

Link

https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.10.4.139

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Relationship Specific Investment
  • In family and household economics, a spouse who takes the home-and-children track invests in an asset whose value is highest in this marriage and lower outside it.

    This sourceAnalyzes marriage-specific investment and its bargaining and hold-up consequences in household economics.

Verification

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Registry ID ref:f0607d2359e4 · see in the full table