Identifiability of Individual Contributions in a Threshold Public Goods Experiment¶
Croson, R., Marks, & Melanie. (1998). Identifiability of Individual Contributions in a Threshold Public Goods Experiment. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 42(2–3), 2-3.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Mechanisms¶
- Volunteer Contribution Rota
- Let visibility enforce. Social accountability — a skipped turn falling to a known name — substitutes for payment or sanction as the free-rider defense.
This sourceFinds that making individual public-good contributions identifiable increases average contributions without introducing a monetary sanction.
- Let visibility enforce. Social accountability — a skipped turn falling to a known name — substitutes for payment or sanction as the free-rider defense.
Verification¶
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Does it back the claim? Not recorded. The single citation of this work carries no recorded support check.
Support is checked per citation rather than per work — the same source can be cited soundly in one article and wrongly in another. Per-citation recording began recently, so a citation with no recorded check is a gap in the record rather than evidence it went unchecked.
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Registry ID ref:f0e385485895 · see in the full table