Self-Targeting¶
Alatas, V., Banerjee, A., Hanna, R., Olken, B. A., Purnamasari, R., & Wai-Poi, M. (2016). Self-Targeting: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia. Journal of Political Economy.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Screening
- Empirical work on welfare take-up (Currie 2006; Bhargava and Manoli 2015) shows that simplification and default enrollment materially raise participation, while field evidence on self-targeting cautions that the incidence of ordeals is not theoretically fixed (Alatas et al. 2016
This sourceShows that self-targeting through ordeals can improve beneficiary composition but that marginal increases in ordeal cost may not further improve targeting; incidence of ordeals is theoretically ambiguous between richer and poorer applicants.
- Empirical work on welfare take-up (Currie 2006; Bhargava and Manoli 2015) shows that simplification and default enrollment materially raise participation, while field evidence on self-targeting cautions that the incidence of ordeals is not theoretically fixed (Alatas et al. 2016
Verification¶
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Registry ID ref:f1b222b8e3f8 · see in the full table