Two-Sided Matching¶
Roth, A. E., & Sotomayor, M. A. O. (1990). Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. Cambridge University Press.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Two-Sided Matching
- The defining move is that allocation happens by mutual selection across a bipartite relation rather than by a single clearing price.
This sourceCanonical monograph defining two-sided matching as price-free bilateral allocation by mutual selection; synthesizes the body of matching theory (recognized by the 2012 Nobel Memorial Prize to Roth and Shapley), the recurrence of the bipartite-plus-stability shape across markets, the reframing of the design question toward stability and strategy-proofness, and the transfer of deferred acceptance across residency, school choice, and kidney exchange.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
The monograph's own abstract frames two-sided matching as a model of search between two sides (firms/workers, buyers/sellers), supporting the bipartite mutual-selection frame but saying nothing about allocation being price-free.
“Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions.”
- The defining move is that allocation happens by mutual selection across a bipartite relation rather than by a single clearing price.
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