Markets for Clean Air¶
Ellerman, A. D., Joskow, P. L., Schmalensee, R., Montero, J., & Bailey, E. M. (2000). Markets for Clean Air: The U.S. Acid Rain Program. Cambridge University Press.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Domain-specific¶
- Policy Design
- Crucially, the instrument chosen was not a uniform command-and-control mandate but a market: a fixed number of tradable emission allowances that plants could buy, sell, or bank, letting reductions happen where they were cheapest
This sourceThe Acid Rain Program's design as the world's first large-scale tradable emission-allowance market, with emission reductions and cost savings quantified from trading.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
“This environmental control program is the world's first large-scale use of a tradeable emission permit system for achieving environmental goals.”
- Crucially, the instrument chosen was not a uniform command-and-control mandate but a market: a fixed number of tradable emission allowances that plants could buy, sell, or bank, letting reductions happen where they were cheapest
Mechanisms¶
- Transferable Credits
- The 1990 Clean Air Act created a market for sulfur-dioxide emissions under the U.S. Acid Rain Program.
This sourceAnalyzes the U.S. Acid Rain Program and its emissions-allowance market.
- The 1990 Clean Air Act created a market for sulfur-dioxide emissions under the U.S. Acid Rain Program.
Verification¶
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