Willpower and Personal Rules.¶
Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2004). Willpower and Personal Rules. Journal of Political Economy, 112(4), 848-886.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Primes¶
- Commitment Device
- And it explains why agents will pay real costs for constraints, an observation that looks like a market anomaly until the time-inconsistency structure is supplied.
This sourceModels personal rules and self-imposed bright lines as internal commitment devices, with a present self managing an imperfectly-known future self by staking self-reputation on not defecting; supports the abstract-reasoning extension to the internal economy of self-image and willpower.
- And it explains why agents will pay real costs for constraints, an observation that looks like a market anomaly until the time-inconsistency structure is supplied.
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