Willpower and Personal Rules.

Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2004). Willpower and Personal Rules. Journal of Political Economy, 112(4), 848-886.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

2004

DOI

10.1086/421167

Link

https://doi.org/10.1086/421167

Cited from

behavioral_economics

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Commitment Device
  • And it explains why agents will pay real costs for constraints, an observation that looks like a market anomaly until the time-inconsistency structure is supplied.

    This sourceModels personal rules and self-imposed bright lines as internal commitment devices, with a present self managing an imperfectly-known future self by staking self-reputation on not defecting; supports the abstract-reasoning extension to the internal economy of self-image and willpower.

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Registry ID ref:f4d75269c365 · see in the full table