A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games

Harsanyi, J. C., & Selten, R. (1988). A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games. MIT Press.

Type

Book

Intellectual base

Review or monograph

Year

1988

Link

https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262582384/a-general-theory-of-equilibrium-selection-in-games/

Cited from

information_theory

Cited by

3 citations across 3 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Coordination Problem and Equilibrium Selection
  • Coordination problem and equilibrium selection asks a narrower, structural question: "When multiple equilibria are equally viable, what determines which one persists?"—the central problem Harsanyi and Selten (1988) formalized in their general theory of equilibrium selection.

    This sourceFormal axiomatic theory selecting a unique equilibrium among multiple Nash equilibria; introduces risk-dominance and the tracing procedure.

Domain-specific

• Battle of the Sexes
  • The standoff is over which agreement to share, not over who swerves. Not a stag hunt. The stag hunt's central tension is risk-dominance versus payoff-dominance with equilibria that differ in safety

    This sourceOrigin of the risk-dominance versus payoff-dominance distinction, which is the equilibrium-safety tension the sentence attributes to the stag hunt.

• Risk dominance
  • In a two-player two-strategy coordination game, one equilibrium risk-dominates when its losses from unilateral mismatch are jointly smaller, equivalently when it is selected by the Harsanyi–Selten product-of-losses comparison.

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