Language-Based Information-Flow Security

Sabelfeld, A., & Myers, A. C. (2003). Language-Based Information-Flow Security. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 21(1), 5-19.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

2003

DOI

10.1109/jsac.2002.806121

Link

https://doi.org/10.1109/JSAC.2002.806121

Cited from

law_governance

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Confidentiality
  • The security condition is then a property of the whole execution trace rather than of any single operation: no observation available at a channel outside the permitted set may vary with the protected input, unless the value passed through a declassifier corresponding to an enumerated exception.

    This sourceSurveys label propagation to derived values, the noninterference condition stated over whole executions, and declassification as an explicit named escape rather than a judgement call.

Domain-specific

• Information Flow (Information-Flow Security)
  • Confidentiality commonly forbids high-to-low dependence; integrity policies can reverse or dualize the order.

Verification

This reference passed the adversarial substantiation pipeline: it was checked to exist and to support the claim it is attached to. See how references were verified.

Links previously used in the corpus

Before the registry existed this work was also linked 1 other way.

• https://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru/papers/jsac/sm-jsac03.pdf ×1

Registry ID ref:f6b6ea3aebc2 · see in the full table