Language-Based Information-Flow Security

Sabelfeld, A., & Myers, A. C. (2003). Language-Based Information-Flow Security. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 21(1), 5-19.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

2003

Volume

21

Issue

1

Pages

5-19

DOI

10.1109/jsac.2002.806121

DOI registrant

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

Link

https://doi.org/10.1109/JSAC.2002.806121

Cited from

law_governance

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Confidentiality
  • The security condition is then a property of the whole execution trace rather than of any single operation: no observation available at a channel outside the permitted set may vary with the protected input, unless the value passed through a declassifier corresponding to an enumerated exception.

    This sourceSurveys label propagation to derived values, the noninterference condition stated over whole executions, and declassification as an explicit named escape rather than a judgement call.

    Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract

    Abstract supports the end-to-end noninterference frame but not the whole-trace-vs-per-operation scope or the declassifier-exception clause; the body text is closed access.

    “An end-to-end confidentiality policy might assert that secret input data cannot be inferred by an attacker through the attacker's observations of system output; this policy regulates information flow.”

    Read by an automated reader; not a human review. How support was checked

Domain-specific

• Information Flow (Information-Flow Security)
  • Confidentiality commonly forbids high-to-low dependence; integrity policies can reverse or dualize the order.

Verification

Does it exist? Confirmed. This work's DOI resolves to a registered record, which fixes its identity. That is all it fixes.

Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 1 of 2 citations: 1 supported in part. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.

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Links previously used in the corpus

Before the registry existed this work was also linked 1 other way.

• https://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru/papers/jsac/sm-jsac03.pdf ×1

Registry ID ref:f6b6ea3aebc2 · see in the full table