Killer Acquisitions¶
Cunningham, Ederer, & Ma. (2021). Killer Acquisitions.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Domain-specific¶
- Rent-Seeking Trap
- Platform markets and digital monopoly — dominant platforms invest in regulatory engagement, patent fences, and killer acquisitions of nascent competitors to defend a network-effect rent rather than improve the product
This sourceStudy of killer acquisitions showing incumbents acquire innovative targets to discontinue their projects and preempt future competition, disproportionately just below antitrust thresholds.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
“This paper argues that incumbent firms may acquire innovative targets solely to discontinue the target’s innovation projects and preempt future competition.”
- Platform markets and digital monopoly — dominant platforms invest in regulatory engagement, patent fences, and killer acquisitions of nascent competitors to defend a network-effect rent rather than improve the product
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Registry ID ref:f7332537d480 · see in the full table