Seemings and Justification

Chris Tucker, e., Seemings, Dogmatism, J. N. E. o., & Phenomenal Conservatism, O. U. P. (2013). Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oxford University Press.

Type

Book

Intellectual base

Review or monograph

Year

2013

Link

no authoritative link yet

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Domain-specific

• Phenomenal conservatism
  • … seems that a red object is present, giving initial justification to believe it is red until unusual lighting or known color distortion defeats that warrant. to A disagreement case asks whether equally strong contrary testimony defeats a subject's intuitive seeming rather than assuming seemings are infallible..

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