To Tax or Not to Tax¶
Nordhaus, W. D. (2007). To Tax or Not to Tax: Alternative Approaches to Slowing Global Warming. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 1(1), 26-44.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Regularization
- The same structure governs a municipal solar-panel design-review fee (high-value installations proceed, frivolous front-facade ones are discouraged, the fee tuned against approval-rate outcomes) and a carbon price (emissions discouraged by a tradable amount calibrated to a reduction target).
This sourceArgues for a calibrated carbon price (a Pigouvian/harmonized tax) as a tradable soft penalty on emissions tuned toward a reduction target — the governance instance of regularization.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
The abstract backs only the carbon-price half: Nordhaus argues price-type carbon taxes beat quantity controls; it says nothing about municipal solar-panel review fees or a tradable amount.
“It compares quantity-oriented control mechanisms like the Kyoto Protocol with price-type control mechanisms such as internationally harmonized carbon taxes. [...] It concludes that price-type approaches such as carbon taxes have major advantages for slowing global warming.”
- The same structure governs a municipal solar-panel design-review fee (high-value installations proceed, frivolous front-facade ones are discouraged, the fee tuned against approval-rate outcomes) and a carbon price (emissions discouraged by a tradable amount calibrated to a reduction target).
Verification¶
Does it exist? Confirmed. This work's DOI resolves to a registered record, which fixes its identity. That is all it fixes.
Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 1 of 1 citation: 1 supported in part. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.
Support is checked per citation rather than per work — the same source can be cited soundly in one article and wrongly in another. Per-citation recording began recently, so a citation with no recorded check is a gap in the record rather than evidence it went unchecked.
See how references were verified.
Registry ID ref:fa5dcdd56d26 · see in the full table