Economic Sanctions Reconsidered¶
Hufbauer, G. C., Schott, J. J., Elliott, K. A., & Oegg, B. (2007). Economic Sanctions Reconsidered.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Reaction-Channel Back-Action
- Antitrust enforcement — aggressive remedies produce political backlash and rule reversal; peripheral harm to incumbent constituencies returns through political channels to the agency. Platform content moderation — false-positive removals harm users; the harm returns through press cycles, regulator scrutiny, and user-exit as operational cost. Sanctions regimes — humanitarian harm metabolizes through coalition politics into diminished diplomatic reach for the sanctioning state.
This sourceEmpirical analysis of 170+ sanctions cases, including humanitarian and coalition costs that diminish the sanctioning state's leverage.
- Antitrust enforcement — aggressive remedies produce political backlash and rule reversal; peripheral harm to incumbent constituencies returns through political channels to the agency. Platform content moderation — false-positive removals harm users; the harm returns through press cycles, regulator scrutiny, and user-exit as operational cost. Sanctions regimes — humanitarian harm metabolizes through coalition politics into diminished diplomatic reach for the sanctioning state.
Verification¶
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