Users Get Routed¶
Johnson, A., Wacek, C., Jansen, R., Sherr, M., & Syverson, P. (2013). Users Get Routed: Traffic Correlation on Tor by Realistic Adversaries. Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer & Communications Security, 337-348.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Mechanisms¶
- Privacy Relay or Anonymizing Proxy
- Its hard limit is that anonymity is probabilistic, not absolute: a well-resourced observer watching both ends of the path can mount a traffic-correlation attack, matching timing and volume to de-anonymize a user the relay claims to protect.
This sourceShows that observers able to see traffic entering and leaving Tor can correlate the flows and deanonymize users, with compromise probabilities rising over repeated use.
- Its hard limit is that anonymity is probabilistic, not absolute: a well-resourced observer watching both ends of the path can mount a traffic-correlation attack, matching timing and volume to de-anonymize a user the relay claims to protect.
Verification¶
This reference passed the adversarial substantiation pipeline: it was checked to exist and to support the claim it is attached to. See how references were verified.
Registry ID ref:fae93974a34f · see in the full table