The Evolution of Vigilance and Its Atrophy Preceding the COVID-19 Global Pandemic¶
Smith, K. A., & Smith, M. S. (2022). The Evolution of Vigilance and Its Atrophy Preceding the COVID-19 Global Pandemic. Risk Management and Healthcare Policy, 15, 1051-1061.
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Primes¶
- Unowned Known Risk
- Diffuse ownership: stockpiling, surveillance, and surge-capacity costs were spread across health ministries, treasuries, hospital systems, and international bodies, none of which captured enough of the avoided-catastrophe benefit during a non-crisis year to make funding its individual best response; each year the line item lost the budget fight to a present, owned, electorally legible need. Time-horizon mismatch: the incubation period — years to decades between major pandemics — exceeded electoral and fiscal-cycle horizons, so the discounted political return on preparedness spending was negative for every individual decision-maker. Precursor tolerance: SARS, MERS, and H1N1 were absorbed as near-misses that "we got through," normalising rather than amplifying the warning signal.
This sourceDocuments the cycle of crisis-driven preparedness followed by complacency — SARS, MERS, and H1N1 normalised as near-misses that atrophied rather than amplified pandemic vigilance, and the early-pandemic disconnect between prior risk knowledge and the surprise narrative.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
Supports the general pattern that vigilance and preparedness spending decay after outbreaks; it does not give the diffuse-ownership or electoral-horizon mechanisms, and says MERS sustained vigilance in South Korea.
“Atrophy of vigilance theory suggests that without manifestations of further incidents, vigilance in hazardous systems will begin to relax within 1 or 2 years and within a decade atrophy will be well-advanced”
- Diffuse ownership: stockpiling, surveillance, and surge-capacity costs were spread across health ministries, treasuries, hospital systems, and international bodies, none of which captured enough of the avoided-catastrophe benefit during a non-crisis year to make funding its individual best response; each year the line item lost the budget fight to a present, owned, electorally legible need. Time-horizon mismatch: the incubation period — years to decades between major pandemics — exceeded electoral and fiscal-cycle horizons, so the discounted political return on preparedness spending was negative for every individual decision-maker. Precursor tolerance: SARS, MERS, and H1N1 were absorbed as near-misses that "we got through," normalising rather than amplifying the warning signal.
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