The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation.¶
Anshelevich, E., Dasgupta, A., Kleinberg, J., Tardos, É., Wexler, T., & Roughgarden, T. (2008). The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation. SIAM Journal on Computing, 38(4), 1602-1623.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Price of Anarchy
- It is distinct from a social dilemma (the game structure that produces the gap) and from an externality (the cause of the gap in many cases), and it is the worst-case complement of the price of stability, the best-case equilibrium-to-optimum ratio.
This sourceIntroduces the price of stability (best-case equilibrium-to-optimum ratio) as the complement to the price of anarchy.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
The abstract defines the price of stability as the best Nash equilibrium's cost-to-optimum ratio, but never mentions the price of anarchy, social dilemmas, or externalities.
“We study the quality of the best Nash equilibrium, and refer to the ratio of its cost to the optimum network cost as the price of stability.”
- It is distinct from a social dilemma (the game structure that produces the gap) and from an externality (the cause of the gap in many cases), and it is the worst-case complement of the price of stability, the best-case equilibrium-to-optimum ratio.
Verification¶
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Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 1 of 1 citation: 1 supported in part. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.
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Registry ID ref:fc0fd737e308 · see in the full table