An Economic Theory of Clubs

Buchanan, J. M. (1965). An Economic Theory of Clubs. Economica, 32(125), 1-14.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1965

Volume

32

Issue

125

Pages

1-14

DOI

10.2307/2552442

DOI registrant

JSTOR

Link

https://doi.org/10.2307/2552442

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Public Goods
  • The club-goods case (Buchanan, "An Economic Theory of Clubs," Economica 1965)

Mechanisms

• Membership Dues or Assessments
  • Enclosure as free-rider defense. Because the benefit is member-gated, non-contributors simply don't get it — the exclusion does the enforcement work.

    This sourceModels club goods as benefits shared within a bounded membership whose enforceable exclusion helps define the club arrangement.

Verification

Does it exist? Confirmed. This work's DOI resolves to a registered record, which fixes its identity. That is all it fixes.

Does it back the claim? Not recorded. Neither this nor any other of the 2 citations of this work carries a recorded support check.

Support is checked per citation rather than per work — the same source can be cited soundly in one article and wrongly in another. Per-citation recording began recently, so a citation with no recorded check is a gap in the record rather than evidence it went unchecked.

See how references were verified.

Registry ID ref:fc2fce13d8fe · see in the full table