Collective Choice and Social Welfare¶
Sen, A. K. (1970). Collective Choice and Social Welfare.
Cited by¶
8 citations across 8 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Aggregation
- The third tension—that the choice of aggregation function is normative even when it presents as merely technical—is the central thesis of Sen's (1970) treatment of collective choice and social welfare, which argues that aggregation rules embed value judgments about how welfare and disagreement are weighed.
This sourceHolden-Day. Foundational treatment of preference aggregation showing aggregation/social-welfare rules embed value judgments about how welfare and disagreement are weighed.
- The third tension—that the choice of aggregation function is normative even when it presents as merely technical—is the central thesis of Sen's (1970) treatment of collective choice and social welfare, which argues that aggregation rules embed value judgments about how welfare and disagreement are weighed.
- Allocation
- Sen (1970) makes this same separation between feasibility, choice, and evaluation foundational to social-choice analysis.
This sourceHolden-Day. Foundational social-choice treatment that separates feasibility, individual choice, and social evaluation/aggregation as distinct analytic layers. SUPPORTS the clarity-section claim that Sen makes the separation between feasibility, choice, and evaluation foundational to social-choice analysis. NOTE: original annotation foregrounded 'preference incompatibility / decision impasse' (a framing borrowed from another prime); adjusted to the feasibility/choice/evaluation separation the marker cites.
- Sen (1970) makes this same separation between feasibility, choice, and evaluation foundational to social-choice analysis.
- Commensurability
- The challenge of commensurability recurs in climate policy (how to value carbon against economic growth?), organizational strategy (how to weight market share against employee wellbeing?), philosophy of science (how to compare competing paradigms with different success criteria?), and criminal justice (how to commensuralize victim harm with offender rehabilitation?), a recurrence Sen (1970) traces through social choice as the persistent problem of aggregating heterogeneous individual valuations into collective decisions.
This sourceHolden-Day. Foundational treatment of preference aggregation that takes Arrow's impossibility theorem as its point of departure and develops the formal pattern of aggregating heterogeneous individual valuations into collective decisions; supports the knowledge-transfer claim about the recurrence of the aggregation problem across domains.
- The challenge of commensurability recurs in climate policy (how to value carbon against economic growth?), organizational strategy (how to weight market share against employee wellbeing?), philosophy of science (how to compare competing paradigms with different success criteria?), and criminal justice (how to commensuralize victim harm with offender rehabilitation?), a recurrence Sen (1970) traces through social choice as the persistent problem of aggregating heterogeneous individual valuations into collective decisions.
- Fairness
- Fairness and efficiency are distinct criteria that often conflict.
This sourceFoundational social-choice/welfare-economics treatment; shows the inadequacy of the Pareto principle for distributional questions (Pareto-optimality is consistent with arbitrarily unequal distributions) and includes the 'impossibility of a Paretian liberal.'
- Fairness and efficiency are distinct criteria that often conflict.
- Pareto Efficiency
- Sen (1970, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal)
This sourceHolden-Day. Foundational treatment of preference aggregation: rigorously distinguishes structural preference incompatibility from coordination or information problems, developing the formal pattern of incompatible objectives producing collective decision impasse.
- Sen (1970, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal)
- Preference
- The prime names the bare commitment of comparability under an ordering from an evaluator's standpoint — nothing more, but nothing less either, as Sen (1970) insists in separating the ordering relation from the choice procedure and from interpersonal aggregation.
This sourceHolden-Day. Foundational treatment of preference aggregation: rigorously distinguishes structural preference incompatibility from coordination or information problems, developing the formal pattern of incompatible objectives producing collective decision impasse.
- The prime names the bare commitment of comparability under an ordering from an evaluator's standpoint — nothing more, but nothing less either, as Sen (1970) insists in separating the ordering relation from the choice procedure and from interpersonal aggregation.
- Preference Heterogeneity and Conflict
- The signature separates systems where preferences can be aligned (through better communication, incentive design, or procedural focus) from systems where preferences are fundamentally misaligned (divergent values, zero-sum resource allocation, trade-offs in inherent opposition), a separation Sen (1970) develops rigorously in Collective Choice and Social Welfare.
This sourceHolden-Day. Foundational treatment of preference aggregation: rigorously distinguishes structural preference incompatibility from coordination or information problems, developing the formal pattern of incompatible objectives producing collective decision impasse.
- The signature separates systems where preferences can be aligned (through better communication, incentive design, or procedural focus) from systems where preferences are fundamentally misaligned (divergent values, zero-sum resource allocation, trade-offs in inherent opposition), a separation Sen (1970) develops rigorously in Collective Choice and Social Welfare.
- Trade-offs
Verification¶
Does it exist? Not checked yet. This entry carries no identifier to resolve. It was extracted from the citation as written in the article, normalized, and deduplicated against the rest of the registry.
Does it back the claim? Not recorded. Neither this nor any other of the 8 citations of this work carries a recorded support check.
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Links previously used in the corpus¶
Before the registry existed this work was also linked 3 other ways.
- https://scholar.harvard.edu/sen/publications/collective-choice-and-social-welfare ×1
- https://www.google.com/books/edition/Collective_Choice_and_Social_Welfare/TwOHDwAAQBAJ ×1
- https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674919211 ×1
Registry ID ref:fc5959264f43 · see in the full table