The Economics of Information.¶
Stigler, G. J. (1961). The Economics of Information. Journal of Political Economy, 69(3), 213-225.
Cited by¶
4 citations across 4 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Bounded Rationality
- Aspiration levels are not fixed but adapt dynamically: if an agent repeatedly achieves a target, aspiration rises; if repeated failures occur, aspiration adjusts downward.
This sourceSequential search with reservation price; foundational to sequential-search and reservation-price decision rules in economics; supports the aspiration/reservation-price and consumer-search claims.
- Aspiration levels are not fixed but adapt dynamically: if an agent repeatedly achieves a target, aspiration rises; if repeated failures occur, aspiration adjusts downward.
- Price Mechanism
- Price-aggregation fails in specific ways that mature practitioners track: thin markets with too few agents for a reliable signal, highly asymmetric information that produces adverse selection, and bubbles or cascades in which price dynamics overwhelm fundamental valuation — failure modes Stigler (1961) first formalized through the economics of information.
This sourceFoundational treatment of search costs and information acquisition as economic activities; the formal basis for modern analysis of price dispersion and aggregation fidelity.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
Stigler's own abstract supports only the economics-of-information frame — buyers' search and establishing the market price; it does not mention thin markets, adverse selection, or bubbles/cascades.
“The author systematically examines one of the important issues of information — establishing the market price. He introduces the concept of «search» — where a buyer wanting to get a better price, is forced to question sellers.”
- Price-aggregation fails in specific ways that mature practitioners track: thin markets with too few agents for a reliable signal, highly asymmetric information that produces adverse selection, and bubbles or cascades in which price dynamics overwhelm fundamental valuation — failure modes Stigler (1961) first formalized through the economics of information.
- Satisficing
- … a decision-making strategy in which an agent (1) sets an aspiration level — a threshold of "good enough" on one or more criteria, either deliberately chosen or derived from prior experience; (2) searches through options sequentially rather than exhaustively, evaluating each option against the aspiration level
This sourceSequential search with reservation price; formal precursor to satisficing. Shows that optimal search policy involves setting a threshold (reservation price) and accepting the first offer meeting it. Cross-G3 B3 candidate: shared with bounded_rationality (#67) — verify dedup at B3.*
- … a decision-making strategy in which an agent (1) sets an aspiration level — a threshold of "good enough" on one or more criteria, either deliberately chosen or derived from prior experience; (2) searches through options sequentially rather than exhaustively, evaluating each option against the aspiration level
Mechanisms¶
- Search Platform
- Its strength is squarely at the front of the exchange: it dissolves search cost — the effort of discovering and comparing options in a dispersed field — which is often the single largest barrier to a beneficial exchange ever getting started.
This sourceDefines search cost as the effort of discovering and comparing dispersed market options.
- Its strength is squarely at the front of the exchange: it dissolves search cost — the effort of discovering and comparing options in a dispersed field — which is often the single largest barrier to a beneficial exchange ever getting started.
Verification¶
Does it exist? Confirmed. This work's DOI resolves to a registered record, which fixes its identity. That is all it fixes.
Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 1 of 4 citations: 1 supported in part. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.
Support is checked per citation rather than per work — the same source can be cited soundly in one article and wrongly in another. Per-citation recording began recently, so a citation with no recorded check is a gap in the record rather than evidence it went unchecked.
See how references were verified.
Registry ID ref:fc851ff53347 · see in the full table