Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy¶
Williams, B. (1985). Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Harvard University Press.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Moral Relativism
- The position creates the characteristic structure where descriptive variation in moral belief is evidence for — but does not entail — metaethical indexation. The universalist-tolerance paradox — the tension that tolerance itself is often asserted as a universalist value, yet relativism licenses relative tolerance — creates the structural core of the position's self-applicability problem.
This sourceWilliams Ethics Limits Philosophy relativism universalism.
- The position creates the characteristic structure where descriptive variation in moral belief is evidence for — but does not entail — metaethical indexation. The universalist-tolerance paradox — the tension that tolerance itself is often asserted as a universalist value, yet relativism licenses relative tolerance — creates the structural core of the position's self-applicability problem.
Domain-specific¶
Verification¶
Does it exist? Confirmed. This work's ISBN resolves to a registered record, which fixes its identity. That is all it fixes.
Does it back the claim? Not recorded. Neither this nor any other of the 2 citations of this work carries a recorded support check.
Support is checked per citation rather than per work — the same source can be cited soundly in one article and wrongly in another. Per-citation recording began recently, so a citation with no recorded check is a gap in the record rather than evidence it went unchecked.
See how references were verified.
Registry ID ref:fce7fdd1cafa · see in the full table