Microeconomic Theory¶
Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M. D., & Green, J. R. (1995). Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press.
Cited by¶
14 citations across 14 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Ceteris Paribus
- In microeconomics it is partial-equilibrium analysis, studying one market while holding all other prices and incomes fixed, with comparative statics as the formal calculus version.
This sourceDevelops partial-equilibrium analysis (studying one market with all other prices and incomes held fixed) and the gap to general equilibrium when held-fixed prices actually respond.
- In microeconomics it is partial-equilibrium analysis, studying one market while holding all other prices and incomes fixed, with comparative statics as the formal calculus version.
- Convexity
- Economics. Convex preferences (diminishing marginal substitution) and convex production sets underlie general-equilibrium existence, and risk-aversion is convexity of disutility in losses.
This sourceConvex preferences and convex production sets underlying general-equilibrium existence; convexity of disutility as risk aversion.
- Economics. Convex preferences (diminishing marginal substitution) and convex production sets underlie general-equilibrium existence, and risk-aversion is convexity of disutility in losses.
- Incentive Compatibility
- develop in their canonical mechanism-design exposition, a mechanism is dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC) when truth-telling is a best response regardless of other agents' reports; it is Bayesian incentive-compatible (BIC) when truth-telling is a best response given beliefs about other agents.
This sourceCanonical graduate microeconomics textbook: develops the preference-based and choice-based approaches in parallel, takes the binary preference relation (with completeness and transitivity) as the primitive of consumer theory before introducing utility, and frames optimization as derived from a primitive preference ordering.
- develop in their canonical mechanism-design exposition, a mechanism is dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC) when truth-telling is a best response regardless of other agents' reports; it is Bayesian incentive-compatible (BIC) when truth-telling is a best response given beliefs about other agents.
- Indifference Curves
- Modern textbook canonization via Mas-Colell-Whinston-Green (1995)
This sourceCanonical graduate microeconomics textbook: develops the preference-based and choice-based approaches in parallel, takes the binary preference relation (with completeness and transitivity) as the primitive of consumer theory before introducing utility, and frames optimization as derived from a primitive preference ordering.
- Modern textbook canonization via Mas-Colell-Whinston-Green (1995)
- Preference
- Preference is an agent's ordering over a choice set on some evaluative dimension — a disposition that, when consulted, says which alternatives are favored, disfavored, indifferent, or incomparable, the framing Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995) take as the canonical primitive of modern microeconomic theory.
This sourceCanonical graduate microeconomics textbook: develops the preference-based and choice-based approaches in parallel, takes the binary preference relation (with completeness and transitivity) as the primitive of consumer theory before introducing utility, and frames optimization as derived from a primitive preference ordering.
- Preference is an agent's ordering over a choice set on some evaluative dimension — a disposition that, when consulted, says which alternatives are favored, disfavored, indifferent, or incomparable, the framing Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995) take as the canonical primitive of modern microeconomic theory.
- Screening
- in their adverse-selection chapter.
This sourceCanonical graduate microeconomics textbook: develops the preference-based and choice-based approaches in parallel, takes the binary preference relation (with completeness and transitivity) as the primitive of consumer theory before introducing utility, and frames optimization as derived from a primitive preference ordering.
- in their adverse-selection chapter.
- Vector Space
- Statistics: data matrices, regression, and projection onto subspaces, where the geometry of least squares is vector-space geometry. Economics: commodity bundles as vectors in \(\mathbb{R}^n\); preferences over bundles; trade as linear combination.
This sourceCommodity bundles as vectors in R^n, preferences over bundles, and trade as linear combination.
- Statistics: data matrices, regression, and projection onto subspaces, where the geometry of least squares is vector-space geometry. Economics: commodity bundles as vectors in \(\mathbb{R}^n\); preferences over bundles; trade as linear combination.
Domain-specific¶
- Bayesian Optimal Mechanism
- Competitive Equilibrium
- Derivative
- In economics, marginal cost, marginal revenue, and marginal utility are each derivatives of the corresponding total
This sourceMas-Colell, Whinston and Green's derivation of marginal revenue p'(q)q + p(q) and marginal cost c'(q) as derivatives.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
“which we normalize the [derivatives] of v(p, w) with respect to p by the [marginal] utility of wealth, it”
- In economics, marginal cost, marginal revenue, and marginal utility are each derivatives of the corresponding total
- Hicksian demand function
- Productive Efficiency
- In the welfare theorems of competitive equilibrium both conditions are satisfied together
This sourceThe fundamental welfare theorems and the first-order conditions for Pareto optimality, under which competitive equilibrium is both production-efficient and allocatively efficient (chapters 5 and 16).
Supported in partVerified against the source
- In the welfare theorems of competitive equilibrium both conditions are satisfied together
- Slutsky Decomposition
- For marginal price changes the resulting decompositions align closely; for larger changes they can differ
This sourceMas-Colell, Whinston and Green, for the two compensation conventions - Slutsky compensation adjusts wealth by delta p times x so the original bundle stays affordable, Hicksian compensation holds utility fixed - with the alignment asserted here holding to first order at the initial price-wealth point rather than for discrete price changes. Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, Proposition 2.F.1: the compensated law of demand follows from the weak axiom, while 'the weak axiom (or preference maximization) is not sufficient to yield the law of demand for price changes that are not compensated' - Giffen behaviour falsifies no axiom.
Supported in partVerified against the source
- For marginal price changes the resulting decompositions align closely; for larger changes they can differ
- Supply
- In the short run, expanding output requires applying more variable inputs (labor, materials, energy) to a fixed capital stock; diminishing marginal productivity means each additional unit costs more to produce than the last, so higher prices are required to justify higher output.
This sourceGraduate price theory that defines the short run by holding an input fixed and derives the short-run cost function from the long-run one.
Supported in partVerified against a saved copy of the source
“fixed in the short run but is free to vary in the long run. (a) Long-run and short-run cost functions”
- In the short run, expanding output requires applying more variable inputs (labor, materials, energy) to a fixed capital stock; diminishing marginal productivity means each additional unit costs more to produce than the last, so higher prices are required to justify higher output.
Verification¶
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