Federalism¶
Riker, W. H. (1964). Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance.
Cited by¶
3 citations across 3 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Autonomy
- In political science and law, regional self-government, institutional independence (of central banks, courts, the academy), and subsidiarity all instantiate the asymmetry at the level of the polity or institution.
This sourceAnalyzes the assignment of scoped decision rights across tiers of government — instantiating the inner/outer-authority asymmetry at the level of the polity (regional self-government, institutional independence, subsidiarity).
- In political science and law, regional self-government, institutional independence (of central banks, courts, the academy), and subsidiarity all instantiate the asymmetry at the level of the polity or institution.
- Checks and Balances
- The full framework synthesizes constitutional and federal architectures, building on Riker's (1964) demonstration that federal divisions of authority constitute another layer of mutual restraint—territorial as well as functional—that prevents any single coalition from capturing all levers of power simultaneously.
This sourceFoundational treatment of federalism as a bargain among constituent units; analyzes how the territorial distribution of authority operates as a further layer of mutual restraint complementing the functional separation of powers.
- The full framework synthesizes constitutional and federal architectures, building on Riker's (1964) demonstration that federal divisions of authority constitute another layer of mutual restraint—territorial as well as functional—that prevents any single coalition from capturing all levers of power simultaneously.
- Conway's Law
- Constitutional design — federal constitutions imprint the pre-existing political topology of the negotiating parties; provinces with strong prior identity acquire constitutional standing while those without do not.
This sourceFoundational account of federalism as a bargain among pre-existing political units; the federal constitution imprints the political topology of the negotiating parties, with units possessing strong prior identity acquiring constitutional standing. (Resolves needs-source-780 and supports marker 786; the federal-bargain-imprints-negotiating-parties claim.)
- Constitutional design — federal constitutions imprint the pre-existing political topology of the negotiating parties; provinces with strong prior identity acquire constitutional standing while those without do not.
Verification¶
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