Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games.

Banks, J. S., & Sobel, J. (1987). Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games. Econometrica, 647-661.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1987

Pages

647-661

DOI

10.2307/1913601

DOI registrant

JSTOR

Link

https://doi.org/10.2307/1913601

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Signaling
  • Refinements — Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion (1987) and Banks-Sobel D1 criterion (1987)

    This sourceIntroduces the D1 criterion for refinement of equilibrium beliefs in signaling games; complements Cho-Kreps.

Verification

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