Auditor Independence, 'Low Balling', and Disclosure Regulation.¶
DeAngelo, L. E. (1981). Auditor Independence, 'Low Balling', and Disclosure Regulation. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 4101(81), 113-127.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Proximity Capture
- Clinical practice — a long-term panel doctor develops loyalty that can override judgement on adverse questions; recusal and second-opinion protocols address it. Academic peer review — a reviewer embedded in the candidate's sub-field has built shared assumptions and is no longer independent of the candidate's frame. Financial audit — long auditor tenure reduces skepticism and converges on management's framing; rotation rules exist to address it.
This sourceAnalyzes how the quasi-rents from an ongoing audit relationship erode auditor independence and skepticism, the economic logic motivating mandatory audit-firm/partner rotation later carried into board-tenure limits.
- Clinical practice — a long-term panel doctor develops loyalty that can override judgement on adverse questions; recusal and second-opinion protocols address it. Academic peer review — a reviewer embedded in the candidate's sub-field has built shared assumptions and is no longer independent of the candidate's frame. Financial audit — long auditor tenure reduces skepticism and converges on management's framing; rotation rules exist to address it.
Verification¶
This reference passed the adversarial substantiation pipeline: it was checked to exist and to support the claim it is attached to. See how references were verified.
Registry ID ref:fe87d288fd85 · see in the full table