Auditor Independence, 'Low Balling', and Disclosure Regulation.

DeAngelo, L. E. (1981). Auditor Independence, 'Low Balling', and Disclosure Regulation. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 113-127.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1981

Pages

113-127

ISSN

0165-4101

DOI

10.1016/0165-4101(81)90009-4

DOI registrant

Elsevier

Link

https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(81)90009-4

Cited from

political_science

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Proximity Capture
  • Clinical practice — a long-term panel doctor develops loyalty that can override judgement on adverse questions; recusal and second-opinion protocols address it. Academic peer review — a reviewer embedded in the candidate's sub-field has built shared assumptions and is no longer independent of the candidate's frame. Financial audit — long auditor tenure reduces skepticism and converges on management's framing; rotation rules exist to address it.

    This sourceAnalyzes how the quasi-rents from an ongoing audit relationship erode auditor independence and skepticism, the economic logic motivating mandatory audit-firm/partner rotation later carried into board-tenure limits.

Verification

Does it exist? Confirmed. This work's DOI resolves to a registered record, which fixes its identity. That is all it fixes.

Does it back the claim? Not recorded. The single citation of this work carries no recorded support check.

Support is checked per citation rather than per work — the same source can be cited soundly in one article and wrongly in another. Per-citation recording began recently, so a citation with no recorded check is a gap in the record rather than evidence it went unchecked.

See how references were verified.

Registry ID ref:fe87d288fd85 · see in the full table