What Conditional Probability Could Not Be.

Hájek, A. (2003). What Conditional Probability Could Not Be. Synthese, 137(3), 273-323.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

2003

Link

https://doi.org/10.1023/b:synt.0000004904.91112.16matched

Cited from

mathematics, philosophy

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Probability
  • 6. Interpretation: the numbers are assigned a meaning — long-run frequency, rational degree of belief, physical propensity, or a mixed account — and that meaning fixes how the claims are tested, used, and updated, the plurality of admissible readings Hájek (2003) catalogs as the unresolved philosophical core of probability.

    This sourceCompanion to Hájek's standard survey of probability interpretations (frequentist, subjectivist, propensity, logical, classical); argues that no single account of conditional probability is adequate to all uses, exhibiting the plurality and unresolved philosophical core of probability semantics.

• Uncertainty
  • of aleatoric (irreducible) and epistemic (reducible) uncertainty, and Hájek's treatment of multiple interpretations of probability

    This sourceCompanion to Hájek's standard survey of probability interpretations (frequentist, subjectivist, propensity, logical, classical); argues that no single account of conditional probability is adequate to all uses, exhibiting the plurality and unresolved philosophical core of probability semantics.

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