Trespass¶

Select the governing trespass branch and jurisdiction, then test protected interest, intrusion, authorization, fault, harm, defenses, and remedy without importing rules from a different branch.

Version: v2 · 2026-09-06 · History
Domain-specific #: 3000
Origin domain: law governance
Subdomain: tort law

Core Idea¶

Trespass is a family of legal wrongs and offenses organized around an unauthorized or unprivileged interference with a protected interest in land, personal property, bodily integrity, or liberty. Its recurring abstraction is not “crossing a boundary is illegal.” It is a branch-selecting decision procedure:

identify the jurisdiction and date;
identify the protected interest and therefore the trespass branch;
identify the claimant or public authority entitled to invoke that branch;
characterize the defendant's act and the applicable intent or fault rule;
determine whether consent, license, or another privilege authorized the act;
apply that branch's harm, causation, defense, and remedy rules.

The American Law Institute's Restatement (Second) organizes intentional invasions of personality, land, and chattels in separate chapters, together with consent and privilege doctrines. Its current Restatement (Third) treatment of intentional torts to persons separately develops assault, battery, false imprisonment, consent, and privileges.^[1]^[2] That architecture matters: trespass to land, trespass to chattels, trespass to the person, and criminal trespass are related but non-interchangeable branches.

Trespass to land protects a possessory or controlling interest in real property. Depending on the jurisdiction, the act can be a personal entry, causing a person or thing to enter, remaining after permission expires, or a qualifying indirect invasion. Intentional entry often turns on intent to be in the physical place, not on an intent to violate a right known to belong to someone else. But unintentional-entry liability, proof of harm, nominal damages, and available equitable relief vary. California CACI 2000, for example, expressly offers intentional, reckless, and negligent alternatives and includes harm and substantial-factor causation; Wisconsin's Jacque decision upheld nominal and punitive relief for a conceded intentional land trespass on its facts.^[3]^[4]

Trespass to chattels protects possession or use of personal property against a lesser interference than conversion. It can include dispossession, damage, impairment, or sufficiently serious deprivation of use, but harmless contact or use is not automatically actionable. California CACI 2101 requires an ownership, possession, or right-to-possess interest, intentional interference or damage, nonconsent, harm, and causation. In Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, the California Supreme Court refused to treat unwanted email as land- like invasion where Intel showed no actual or threatened injury to the computer system or its possessory interest.^[3]^[5]

Trespass to the person is a historical and comparative umbrella for invasions of bodily integrity and liberty. In contemporary U.S. pleading, assault, battery, and false imprisonment are ordinarily separate torts with separate elements. A California battery instruction, for example, asks about an intended harmful or offensive touching, nonconsent, harm or offense, and— where disputed—objective offensiveness. Those roles cannot be borrowed from land or chattel doctrine merely because all once sat under “trespass.”^[3]

Criminal trespass belongs to public law and is created by statute. New York Penal Law §140.10, for example, defines third-degree criminal trespass through knowing unlawful entry or remaining in specified buildings or real property and classifies it as a class B misdemeanor. Section 140.00 defines unlawful entry or remaining through license or privilege and gives special rules for premises open to the public and apparently unused unenclosed land. Those details illustrate why a civil finding, a posted sign, or an unwanted presence does not automatically establish every criminal trespass offense.^[6]^[7]

The node therefore teaches a controlled legal classification, not a rule for a live dispute. Anyone applying it to real conduct must consult the controlling statute, cases, procedural rules, and defenses in the relevant jurisdiction.

Structural Signature¶

Sig role-phrases:

the governing jurisdiction and time — the sovereign, court system, and operative date that determine controlling law
the branch selector — land, chattels, person/liberty, or a particular statutory criminal offense
the protected interest — possession or control of land, possession or use of a chattel, bodily integrity, liberty, or the public interest specified by statute
the eligible claimant or prosecutor — the possessor, right-to-possess holder, affected person, or public authority with standing to proceed
the defendant act — entry, remaining, causing entry, touching, confinement, dispossession, intermeddling, impairment, or another act named by the selected rule
the mental-state or fault rule — intent, knowledge, recklessness, negligence, or another branch- and jurisdiction-specific standard
the authorization state — consent, license, permission, their scope and withdrawal, or absence of authorization
the independent privilege or defense — necessity, self-defense, lawful process, public authority, or another doctrine that can justify or limit the interference without claimant consent
the harm and causation threshold — whether invasion alone suffices, what injury must be shown, and how the act must connect to it
the legal consequence — nominal or compensatory damages, injunction, restitutionary or property relief, punitive damages under an additional standard, or a statutory public-law penalty

The roles run in a fixed dependency order. An analyst cannot choose the harm rule before choosing the branch, cannot infer nonauthorization merely from disapproval after the fact, and cannot infer a remedy merely from the existence of a technical wrong. A complete statement reads “under jurisdiction J, at time T, branch B applies because interest I and act A satisfy its selector; the authorization, fault, privilege, harm, causation, and remedy rules then yield result R.”

This signature remains recognizable across branches without pretending their elements are identical. It is invariant at the level of legal workflow and variable at the level of operative doctrine.

What It Is Not¶

Not a synonym for unwanted conduct. An act may be rude, alarming, or against house rules without satisfying a civil tort or criminal statute.
Not a universal no-permission formula. Lack of consent can be central, but standing, act, fault, privilege, harm, causation, and remedy remain.
Not ownership alone. Many branches protect possession or a right to possess; title can be relevant without being the sole claimant criterion.
Not a single intentional tort. Some land regimes recognize reckless, negligent, or abnormally dangerous routes, while criminal statutes select their own culpability requirements.
Not the same harm rule across objects. Intentional land entry can support nominal relief in settings where harmless intermeddling with a chattel does not support an action.
Not nuisance. Nuisance commonly focuses on unreasonable interference with use and enjoyment; trespass commonly focuses on possessory invasion. Some facts support both, but neither definition can replace the other.
Not conversion. Conversion requires dominion or interference serious enough to justify the corresponding conversion remedy, often the chattel's full value. Trespass to chattels covers lesser actionable interferences.
Not burglary. Burglary adds offense-specific statutory commitments, commonly an intent to commit another offense; unlawful presence alone is not a general burglary definition.
Not a Fourth Amendment search rule. Constitutional cases may use trespassory concepts to decide whether government conduct is a search, but that inquiry is not the private tort.
Not a rule that servers are land. Digital-resource cases must satisfy the governing chattel, computer-misuse, contract, privacy, or statutory doctrine.
Not legal advice. The abstraction is a comparative reasoning aid and cannot establish liability, guilt, limitation periods, jurisdiction, or strategy in a real matter.

Scope of Application¶

Civil land disputes. The framework separates claimant possession or control, intentional and unintentional entry routes, permission and its scope, necessity and other privileges, continuing intrusions, harm, and remedies. Property lines, easements, leases, public accommodations, airspace, subsurface entry, particles, vibrations, and removal obligations can activate distinct local rules rather than one physical-crossing test.

Personal-property interference. Borrowing, moving, damaging, disabling, or using a chattel can be analyzed by the seriousness and kind of interference. The framework distinguishes a harmless contact, actionable dispossession or impairment, and conversion-level dominion.

Bodily integrity and liberty. Historical “trespass to the person” language can be translated into the modern named tort—assault, battery, or false imprisonment—before its distinct intent, contact or apprehension, confinement, consent, privilege, and damages questions are asked.^[2]

Networked and electronic resources. Automated access, bulk messages, crawling, device use, or server load may be pleaded through chattel theories in some jurisdictions. Intel makes the constraint vivid: California did not turn unwanted electronic contact into strict land-like exclusion and instead required actual or threatened injury connected to the computer system or its possessory use.^[5]

Criminal enforcement. The abstraction helps read offense statutes without silently adding civil doctrine. It identifies the act, location, notice, unlawfulness, culpability, degree, defenses, and classification the legislature actually chose. New York's open-premises and unenclosed-land qualifications show that “without subjective permission” is not a complete statutory test.^[6]

Comparative and historical legal analysis. The family structure explains why older cases use forms of action and labels that modern jurisdictions have split, merged, or codified. Transfer is legitimate only after translating the old label into the current jurisdiction's elements.

The scope excludes metaphorical “trespass” in etiquette, relationships, game spaces, or system design unless a legal rule is actually at issue. It also stops short of advice about any live dispute.

Clarity¶

The abstraction clarifies trespass by forcing two questions before every element list: what protected interest, and what jurisdiction? “Someone entered without permission” is underdetermined. The entry may implicate a possessor's civil land claim, a lease or easement, a privilege, a public-space rule, or a precisely defined statutory offense. The same physical movement can receive different classifications because the legal interest, authority, mental state, notice, and consequence differ.

It also separates three authorization propositions that everyday language collapses:

the claimant affirmatively consented;
law supplied a license or privilege independently of claimant consent;
neither authorization source applied.

Only the third state supports the nonauthorization role, and even then the other elements remain. A store open to the public illustrates the difference: entry may initially be licensed despite no personal invitation, while entry into a restricted room or remaining after a legally effective direction to leave may be different. New York codifies versions of those distinctions for its criminal-trespass article; other jurisdictions use other formulations.^[6]

Finally, the land/chattel comparison blocks a common inference error. Possessory protection does not imply one harm threshold for every resource. Jacque and Intel are not inconsistent merely because one vindicated exclusion without compensatory loss and the other rejected liability without chattel injury. They apply different jurisdictions, branches, interests, and remedial rules.^[4]^[5]

Manages Complexity¶

Trespass disputes combine facts that sound simple—entry, touching, taking, remaining—with layered legal variables. The branch-selector architecture compresses that complexity into a reviewable matrix. Each possible theory gets one row; jurisdiction, interest, claimant, act, fault, authorization, privilege, harm, causation, and consequence become columns. Unsupported theories fail at the earliest missing role instead of borrowing a favorable rule from another row.

This structure improves research. Rather than searching “is this trespass?”, the analyst asks narrower questions: Who had possession? Was permission limited or withdrawn? Does the jurisdiction treat this indirect incursion as entry or nuisance? Does chattel intermeddling require impairment, dispossession, or substantial loss of use? What mental state does the cited offense require? Does necessity create a privilege or only affect damages? Which remedies are available after liability, and which require an additional showing?

It also manages proof. The same evidence can populate different roles without answering all of them. A posted sign may bear on notice or license; it does not prove ownership, actual entry, knowledge, lack of another privilege, or harm. A system log may prove electronic contact; it does not by itself prove impairment. A deliberate route may prove intended entry even if the actor mistook the property line; whether that mistake matters is a jurisdictional question.

The abstraction does not simplify law into certainty. Its benefit is auditability: every conclusion identifies the selected rule and exposes the missing fact or authority that could change the result.

Abstract Reasoning¶

Use this recognition and inference sequence:

Freeze the legal frame. Name the jurisdiction, operative date, civil or criminal posture, and controlling source hierarchy.
Select the protected interest. Land possession, chattel possession/use, bodily integrity, liberty, or a statutory public interest determines the candidate branch.
Test the claimant or charging authority. Ownership evidence may help, but ask for the exact possession, control, standing, or public authority the rule requires.
Specify the act. Replace “intrusion” with the legally relevant conduct: enter, remain, cause entry, touch, confine, dispossess, impair, or use.
Apply the correct culpability rule. Separate intent to perform the act from knowledge of wrongfulness, and do not import a civil standard into a penal statute.
Resolve authorization and privilege separately. Identify source, scope, conditions, duration, withdrawal, capacity, and any law-supplied privilege.
Test harm and causation. Ask whether invasion is actionable per se, whether dispossession itself supplies the injury, or whether measurable impairment, loss of use, or other harm is required.
Select consequence last. Liability does not guarantee every requested remedy; punitive damages, injunctions, and criminal penalties have additional standards.

This sequence licenses diagnostic predictions. If a complaint about email identifies only lack of permission, the missing role may be chattel injury. If land was entered deliberately but the actor honestly mistook the boundary, intent to enter may still be present under a rule like California's, while other issues remain open.^[3] If a public premise was initially open, the decisive criminal question may be whether and how license ended under the statute. If force or confinement affected a person, the analysis should switch to the named personal tort instead of treating the body as property.

Knowledge Transfer¶

Transfer within law is exact at the level of role discipline. Land, chattels, person, and criminal statutes all reward the same habits: select the protected interest, locate the authorization rule, distinguish act from legal wrongfulness, keep privileges separate, and postpone remedies until liability is established. That common workflow enables comparison without merging doctrine.

Transfer from physical property to networked resources is conditional. A server is a chattel or system governed by specific law, not metaphorical real estate. The useful transfer is to ask about possession, authorization, intermeddling, impairment, loss of use, and alternative statutory regimes. The invalid transfer is to assume every unwanted packet is the equivalent of a footstep on land. Intel expressly declined that rigid move in California.^[5]

Transfer to security engineering is analogical. Boundary and access-control models help identify principals, resources, actions, permissions, and policy decisions. They do not establish legal standing, culpability, privilege, causation, or remedy. “Unauthorized access” can be an engineering verdict without being a completed trespass analysis.

Transfer outside law becomes metaphorical unless an institution supplies recognized protected interests, authoritative rules, adjudication, and consequences. The portable residue belongs to Boundary and Consent; the legal branch selector remains the domain accent.

Examples¶

Deliberate land crossing after refusal: Jacque v. Steenberg Homes¶

Steenberg Homes wanted to deliver a mobile home by the easiest route, across the Jacques' Wisconsin land. The Jacques repeatedly refused permission. Steenberg employees nevertheless plowed a path through the snow-covered field and moved the home across it. Steenberg conceded intentional trespass at trial. The jury awarded $1 nominal damages and $100,000 punitive damages; the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that nominal damages for intentional land trespass could support punitive damages and ordered reinstatement of the award, which it found not excessive on the record.^[4]

Mapped back:

jurisdiction and branch: Wisconsin civil intentional trespass to land, decided in 1997
protected interest and claimant: the Jacques' possession and ownership of the farm field
defendant act: plowing a path and transporting a mobile home across it
fault: deliberate physical entry; Steenberg conceded intentional trespass
authorization: repeated, unambiguous refusals eliminated any claimed permission for the route
privilege: no controlling privilege was accepted in the decision
harm threshold: no compensatory damages were proved; the jury used nominal damages to recognize the invasion
consequence: Wisconsin permitted the nominal award to support punitive damages under the circumstances; that remedial holding is not a universal punitive-damages rule

The example shows why ease, efficiency, and lack of measurable physical loss do not necessarily erase an intentional land trespass—and why remedy must be stated with the deciding jurisdiction.

Unwanted email without system injury: Intel Corp. v. Hamidi¶

Over twenty-one months, former employee Kourosh Hamidi sent six mass emails to thousands of Intel employee addresses. Intel demanded that he stop and tried to block the mailings. The record showed no security breach used to obtain access, no physical damage, no slowing or functional impairment, and no deprivation of Intel's use of its computers. Intel obtained an injunction below on trespass-to- chattels grounds, but the California Supreme Court reversed. It held that the California tort did not encompass the communications without actual or threatened injury to the computer system or Intel's legally protected possessory interest in it.^[5]

Mapped back:

jurisdiction and branch: California civil trespass to chattels, decided in 2003
protected interest and claimant: Intel's possession and use of its computer system
defendant act: repeated mass emailing through the externally accessible part of that system
fault: intentional sending and continuation after Intel's demand
authorization: Intel objected, although willing employee recipients and the externally accessible system complicated the authorization narrative
privilege: the majority did not need to establish an affirmative privilege because the chattel-injury requirement failed
harm threshold: no actual or threatened functional injury, impairment, dispossession, or measurable loss of use of the chattel was shown
consequence: no actionable California trespass to chattels on the undisputed record; the injunction could not stand on that theory

The example shows why nonconsent and intentional electronic contact do not by themselves complete a chattel claim, and why land doctrine cannot be copied into a network case.

Structural Tensions¶

T1: Possessory dignity versus measurable injury. Land doctrine can vindicate the right to exclude even where compensatory loss is absent, while chattel doctrine often filters harmless intermeddling through an injury or dispossession threshold. Diagnostic: Which protected interest and branch supplies the harm rule, and is a land rule being imported into a chattel case?

T2: Clear boundaries versus legally porous access. A fence, server rule, or bodily limit looks binary, but public invitation, easements, licenses, necessity, official authority, and statutory qualifications make legal access conditional. Diagnostic: What source created the apparent permission or privilege, and what event narrowed or ended it?

T3: Claimant consent versus independent privilege. Consent expresses the right-holder's authorization, but law can authorize conduct without it or deny effect to purported consent. Diagnostic: Is authorization derived from the claimant, from law, or from neither—and are capacity, scope, and withdrawal valid under the governing rule?

T4: Physical analogy versus digital function. Treating a server as fenced land makes exclusion intuitive, but can turn ordinary communication into strict property liability and ignore actual system function. Diagnostic: Is the claim supported by dispossession, impairment, threatened capacity loss, or another recognized chattel injury, rather than spatial metaphor alone?

T5: Private vindication versus public punishment. Civil trespass protects an individual's interest through private remedies; criminal trespass expresses a legislature's public prohibition through defined offenses and penalties. Diagnostic: Who brings the proceeding, what source defines it, and have all statutory act, location, notice, and mental-state elements been proved?

T6: Bodily integrity versus property vocabulary. Historical grouping makes the branches comparable, but analyzing assault, battery, or confinement as ownership of a body can distort the protected interest and defense structure. Diagnostic: Has the personal branch been translated into its current named tort and current elements before analysis?

T7: Structural autonomy versus reduction to parents. Boundary and Consent explain the portable skeleton, while standing, branch taxonomy, burdens, privileges, harm rules, and remedies make trespass legally autonomous. Diagnostic: If the legal branch selector and jurisdiction-specific consequences are removed, does the remaining claim say more than “a boundary was crossed without authorization”? If not, it belongs to the parents; if yes, the trespass node remains necessary.

Structural–Framed Character¶

Trespass is framed with an aggregate structural–framed score of 1.0.

Vocabulary travels — 1.0. “Standing,” “possession,” “license,” “privilege,” “fault,” “liability,” and “remedy” carry legal doctrine with them rather than functioning as neutral system terms.
Evaluative weight — 1.0. The abstraction classifies conduct as wrongful, privileged, actionable, punishable, or remediable.
Institutional origin — 1.0. Courts, legislatures, Restatements, pleading systems, burdens, and remedies constitute the object.
Human-practice bound — 1.0. Without persons or institutions recognizing protected interests and legal consequences, there is no trespass—only movement, contact, or interference.
Import versus recognize — 1.0. Applying trespass outside law imports a legal frame; it does not merely reveal a substrate-neutral structure already present.

Its character: The node has a simple structural scaffold—protected domain, crossing, authorization, consequence—but its identity is produced by legal institutions. The framing is constitutive, not ornamental.

Structural Core vs. Domain Accent¶

The structural core is compact: an actor affects a protected domain; a rule distinguishes authorized from unauthorized interference; a decision procedure maps the event to a consequence. Boundary supplies the demarcated domain, and Consent supplies one route by which an otherwise excluded act becomes authorized.

The domain accent is everything that makes the decision legal rather than metaphorical: jurisdiction, source hierarchy, protected possessory and personal interests, standing, intent and fault doctrines, public license, privilege, burdens, proof, harm, causation, civil remedies, offense grading, and penalties. These commitments cannot be derived from Boundary or Consent.

This division explains both transfer and non-reduction. The parent primes support useful questions—what is protected, what crossed, who could authorize, and whether authorization covered the act—but only trespass doctrine selects the branch and legal consequence. Conversely, if a use of “trespass” lacks a recognized legal interest, authoritative rule, and legal consequence, it is best treated as analogy rather than an instance of this node.

Boundary — prospective composition / presupposes / strict. Every trespass branch identifies a legally protected domain—land possession, chattel use, bodily integrity, liberty, or statutory premises—and determines whether an act entered, occupied, touched, confined, dispossessed, or otherwise crossed it. Boundary is necessary but not sufficient: a crossing may be authorized, privileged, nonactionable, or outside the selected rule.

Consent — prospective composition / presupposes / strict. The civil intentional branches and criminal unlawful-entry schemes characteristically ask whether the actor had permission, license, or authority and whether its scope or duration was exceeded. Consent supplies one authorization mechanism. The relation does not claim that nonconsent alone establishes trespass or that all privileges are acts of consent.

Property Rights — strong prose relation, no proposed structured edge. Land and chattel trespass protect strands of possession, use, and exclusion, but the umbrella also contains bodily-integrity and liberty branches. Making Property Rights a parent would misclassify the person branch.

Access Control — analogy and implementation neighbor. Both analyze actor, resource, action, and permission. Access-control denial is a policy verdict; trespass adds legal interest, standing, fault, privilege, harm, proof, and consequence.

Sovereignty — declined as parent. Sovereignty is final public authority within a domain. A private possessor's land claim, an individual's bodily integrity, and a chattel user's possessory interest are not instances of sovereignty.

Relationships to Other Abstractions¶

Current abstraction Trespass Domain-specific

Parents (2) — more general patterns this builds on

Trespass is part of Boundary Prime

Boundary — prospective composition / presupposes / strict. Every trespass branch identifies a legally protected domain—land possession, chattel use, bodily integrity, liberty, or statutory premises—and determines whether an act entered.
Trespass presupposes, typical Consent Prime

Boundary — prospective composition / presupposes / strict. Every trespass branch identifies a legally protected domain—land possession, chattel use, bodily integrity, liberty, or statutory premises—and determines whether an act entered.

Hierarchy paths (2) — routes to 2 parentless roots

Trespass → Consent → Authority

Show alternative path (1)

Neighborhood in Abstraction Space¶

Trespass sits in a sparse region of the domain-specific corpus (78^th percentile for distinctiveness): few abstractions share its structure, so a faithful description tends to retrieve it precisely.

Family — Unclustered & Miscellaneous (1565 abstractions)

Nearest neighbors

Computed from structural-signature embeddings · 2026-09-08

Not to Be Confused With¶

Boundary. Boundary marks inside and outside; trespass adjudicates a legally protected interference. Tell: Are standing, fault, privilege, proof, and remedy part of the claim?
Consent. Consent can authorize conduct that would otherwise be wrongful; it is not the wrong itself. Tell: Is the object an authorization act or a branch-specific liability analysis?
Property Rights. Property rights define enforceable entitlement bundles; trespass is one family of wrongs protecting some of those entitlements and also personal interests. Tell: Is the analysis defining the bundle or testing a particular invasion?
Nuisance. Nuisance centers on interference with use or enjoyment rather than necessarily possessory entry. Tell: Is the load-bearing fact an invasion of possession or an unreasonable effect on use and enjoyment?
Conversion. Conversion concerns sufficiently serious dominion over a chattel. Tell: Does the remedy treat the defendant as owing the chattel's value, or only actual loss from lesser interference?
Assault, battery, and false imprisonment. These are the current named personal torts commonly grouped historically as trespass to the person. Tell: Is the protected interest apprehension, bodily contact, or freedom of movement, with that tort's own elements?
Criminal trespass. This is an offense defined by a particular statute, not civil trespass plus punishment. Tell: Can every element, degree, and penalty be traced to the operative penal law?
Burglary. Burglary ordinarily adds a further-intent or offense component fixed by statute. Tell: Is unlawful entry or remaining enough under the cited provision, or must another criminal purpose be proved?
Unauthorized access. This can be a policy, contract, security, or computer-crime classification. Tell: Has a recognized trespass branch's protected interest and harm rule been satisfied?
Fourth Amendment trespassory search. That doctrine asks whether government conduct constitutes a constitutional search. Tell: Is the requested consequence suppression or constitutional review rather than a private tort remedy?
Metaphorical trespass. Etiquette and interpersonal language can describe an intrusion without law. Tell: Which jurisdiction, legal source, and enforceable consequence make the use literal?

References¶

[1] American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Second, Torts, official publication description and contents for intentional invasions of personality, land, and chattels and their privileges (accessed 2026-08-26). registry ↩

[2] American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Third, Torts: Intentional Torts to Persons, covering assault, battery, false imprisonment, consent, and privileges (accessed 2026-08-26). registry ↩a ↩b

[3] Judicial Council of California, Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions (CACI), 2026 Edition, CACI Nos. 2000, 2101, and 1300 (accessed 2026-08-26). registry ↩a ↩b ↩c ↩d

[4] Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 209 Wis. 2d 605, 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997), official Wisconsin Supreme Court opinion. registry ↩a ↩b ↩c

[5] Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4^th 1342 (2003), California Supreme Court opinion reproduced by Stanford Law School's California Supreme Court Resources. registry ↩a ↩b ↩c ↩d ↩e

[6] New York State Senate, Penal Law §140.00, “Criminal trespass and burglary; definitions of terms”, current Open Legislation text (accessed 2026-08-26). registry ↩a ↩b ↩c

[7] New York State Senate, Penal Law §140.10, “Criminal trespass in the third degree”, current Open Legislation text (accessed 2026-08-26). registry ↩