Fallacies¶
Hamblin, C. L. (1970). Fallacies.
Cited by¶
8 citations across 8 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Informal Fallacy
- Second, the argument has a recurring, recognizable shape that earns a name (no-true-Scotsman, nirvana fallacy, straw man, ad hominem, equivocation, false dilemma, slippery slope, begging the question
This sourceFoundational modern treatment of the fallacies as named recurring argument types, including the standard list (straw man, ad hominem, equivocation, false dilemma, begging the question) and critique of the 'standard treatment'.
- Second, the argument has a recurring, recognizable shape that earns a name (no-true-Scotsman, nirvana fallacy, straw man, ad hominem, equivocation, false dilemma, slippery slope, begging the question
Domain-specific¶
- Ad Baculum (Appeal to Force)
- The Latin-named informal fallacies of relevance (ad baculum, ad misericordiam, ad populum, ad verecundiam, and their siblings) all share this substitution structure
This sourceHamblin's history of the fallacies, which describes the arguments ad as appeals to particular emotions set against argument to the point at issue while criticising the received descriptions of them as unscientific.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
“The other ‘arguments ad’ are more rately mentioned. Most of them are appeals to one or other specified emotion.”
- The Latin-named informal fallacies of relevance (ad baculum, ad misericordiam, ad populum, ad verecundiam, and their siblings) all share this substitution structure
- Ad Misericordiam (Appeal to Pity)
- Diagnosing the fallacy denies neither the suffering nor the appropriateness of feeling for it. Not ad baculum or its other siblings. All are relevance fallacies that drop a non-truth-bearing lever into the evidence-slot, but the levers differ: ad baculum substitutes fear, ad populum Solidarity, ad verecundiam deference
This sourceSurvey of the traditional fallacy catalogue, grouping argumentum ad verecundiam with ad hominem among the 'relevance' arguments ad … and treating argumentum ad baculum alongside Copi's account.
Supported in partVerified against a saved copy of the source
“Only the argumentum ad verecundiam , in fact, has anything of the modern”
- Diagnosing the fallacy denies neither the suffering nor the appropriateness of feeling for it. Not ad baculum or its other siblings. All are relevance fallacies that drop a non-truth-bearing lever into the evidence-slot, but the levers differ: ad baculum substitutes fear, ad populum Solidarity, ad verecundiam deference
- Circular Reasoning
- Informal logic and rhetoric — the canonical petitio principii, inventoried since Aristotle's Topics in every standard fallacy catalogue
This sourceHamblin's Fallacies, which treats the petitio principii ('begging the question') as a named item in its catalogue of fallacies.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
“circle argument’ or by its Latin name, [petitio principii]”
- Informal logic and rhetoric — the canonical petitio principii, inventoried since Aristotle's Topics in every standard fallacy catalogue
- Complex Question
- Rhetoric and informal logic — the classic Aristotelian fallacy, taxonomized beside begging the question and false dilemma in critical-thinking pedagogy
This sourceHamblin's Fallacies, which treats the complex question within its account of Aristotle's Rhetoric and alongside begging the question.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
“Fallacy of the Complex [Question] is most commonly illustrated by the [question] 'Have you stopped”
- Rhetoric and informal logic — the classic Aristotelian fallacy, taxonomized beside begging the question and false dilemma in critical-thinking pedagogy
- Fallacy of Accident
- The fallacy of accident (Aristotle's fallacy para to symbebēkos, Latin fallacia accidentis), in its modern textbook sense, is the inferential mistake of applying a general rule to a particular case that falls under the rule's terms grammatically but lies outside its intended scope because of an accidental feature — an inessential, context-dependent property the rule did not contemplate (Aristotle's own fallacy of accident concerned ascribing to a thing what holds of its accident; the rule-overreach reading is a later reinterpretation)
This sourceTraces the fallacy of accident to Aristotle's contrast between accidental and essential properties and documents its later textbook reading as applying a general rule to a case whose accidental circumstances make the rule inapplicable.
Supported in partVerified against the source
- The fallacy of accident (Aristotle's fallacy para to symbebēkos, Latin fallacia accidentis), in its modern textbook sense, is the inferential mistake of applying a general rule to a particular case that falls under the rule's terms grammatically but lies outside its intended scope because of an accidental feature — an inessential, context-dependent property the rule did not contemplate (Aristotle's own fallacy of accident concerned ascribing to a thing what holds of its accident; the rule-overreach reading is a later reinterpretation)
- Irrelevant conclusion
- Named by Aristotle in the Sophistical Refutations as the misconception of refutation to which he held every fallacy could be reduced, and treated since Whately and in many later textbooks as the umbrella under which red herring, straw man, appeal to emotion, and many other named diversions are filed, the fallacy has four components: a claim or question actually at issue (Q); an arguer who purports to address Q; an argument that in fact establishes some related-but-distinct claim (Q′); and the substitution of Q′ for Q in the argumentative record, so that subsequent discussion proceeds as if Q had been settled
This sourceThe history of ignoratio elenchi from Aristotle's misconception of refutation, which he held all fallacies reduce to, to Whately's and later textbooks' filing of the diversionary 'ad' arguments under it. The tradition, from Whately on, of filing diversionary appeals to authority, to the person and to the people under ignoratio elenchi, which some textbooks use as a catch-all of relevance fallacies.
Supported in partVerified against the source
- Named by Aristotle in the Sophistical Refutations as the misconception of refutation to which he held every fallacy could be reduced, and treated since Whately and in many later textbooks as the umbrella under which red herring, straw man, appeal to emotion, and many other named diversions are filed, the fallacy has four components: a claim or question actually at issue (Q); an arguer who purports to address Q; an argument that in fact establishes some related-but-distinct claim (Q′); and the substitution of Q′ for Q in the argumentative record, so that subsequent discussion proceeds as if Q had been settled
Mechanisms¶
- Cross-Stasis Dialogue Protocol
- In fast, adversarial, or public exchanges — debates, hearings, board meetings — that real-time catch is decisive, and naming a slide the moment it happens is what stops informal fallacies of relevance, the ignoratio elenchi of arguing past the point, from carrying the room.
This sourceIdentifies ignoratio elenchi as the fallacy of irrelevant conclusion—arguing to a point other than the issue under dispute.
- In fast, adversarial, or public exchanges — debates, hearings, board meetings — that real-time catch is decisive, and naming a slide the moment it happens is what stops informal fallacies of relevance, the ignoratio elenchi of arguing past the point, from carrying the room.
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