A Treatise of Human Nature, Volume III¶
Hume, D. (1740). A Treatise of Human Nature, Volume III: Of Morals.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Domain-specific¶
- Is-Ought Problem
- The is-ought problem is the metaethical principle, originating in David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40, Book III, Part I, §I)
SupportedVerified against the source
- The is-ought problem is the metaethical principle, originating in David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40, Book III, Part I, §I)
Mechanisms¶
- Decision Memo Epistemic-Mode Section
- It is a working instance of the fact–value distinction — the insight that empirical claims and normative commitments are different kinds of thing and cannot be derived from one another.
This sourceDistinguishes propositions about what is from propositions about what ought to be and challenges any unexplained deduction of the latter from the former.
- It is a working instance of the fact–value distinction — the insight that empirical claims and normative commitments are different kinds of thing and cannot be derived from one another.
Verification¶
Does it exist? Not checked yet. This entry carries no identifier to resolve. It was extracted from the citation as written in the article, normalized, and deduplicated against the rest of the registry.
Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 1 of 2 citations: 1 supported. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.
Support is checked per citation rather than per work — the same source can be cited soundly in one article and wrongly in another. Per-citation recording began recently, so a citation with no recorded check is a gap in the record rather than evidence it went unchecked.
See how references were verified.
Registry ID ref:46d478d00191 · see in the full table