On the Rationale of Group Decision-making.

Black, D. (1948). On the Rationale of Group Decision-making. Journal of Political Economy, 56(1), 23-34.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1948

Volume

56

Issue

1

Pages

23-34

DOI

10.1086/256633

DOI registrant

University of Chicago Press

Link

https://doi.org/10.1086/256633

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

3 citations across 3 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Social Choice
  • It names the single-peaked-preferences escape: when preferences have special structure on a one-dimensional axis, the Arrow impossibility lifts and the median-voter theorem holds, a lesson transferring to political economy, governance, and product design that restricting the preference domain restores possibility.

    This sourceProves the median-voter theorem for single-peaked preferences — the domain restriction that lifts Arrow's impossibility and restores a well-behaved aggregation rule.

Domain-specific

• Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
  • Relaxing unrestricted domain admits majority voting when preferences are single-peaked (Black's median-voter theorem)

    This sourceSingle-peaked preferences make pairwise majority rule transitive and select the median voter's preferred alternative.

Mechanisms

• Swing-Vote Scenario Review
  • The pivotal or median voter is a real and useful idea, but it is an idealization, not a standing fact.

    This sourceDerives a median-voter result under restrictive ordering assumptions, making the pivotal median position useful but conditional rather than universal.

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