On the Rationale of Group Decision-making.

Black, D. (1948). On the Rationale of Group Decision-making. Journal of Political Economy, 56(1), 23-34.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1948

DOI

10.1086/256633

Link

https://doi.org/10.1086/256633

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Social Choice
  • It names the single-peaked-preferences escape: when preferences have special structure on a one-dimensional axis, the Arrow impossibility lifts and the median-voter theorem holds, a lesson transferring to political economy, governance, and product design that restricting the preference domain restores possibility.

    This sourceProves the median-voter theorem for single-peaked preferences — the domain restriction that lifts Arrow's impossibility and restores a well-behaved aggregation rule.

Verification

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Registry ID ref:5edea2555a6b · see in the full table