Principia Ethica¶
Moore, G. E. (1903). Principia Ethica. Cambridge University Press.
Cited by¶
3 citations across 3 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Normativity
- Normativity appears in metaethics (the ground of moral ought-claims and the debate over naturalism vs. non-naturalism; Moore's Principia Ethica
This sourceMoore Principia Ethica open-question argument naturalism.
- Normativity appears in metaethics (the ground of moral ought-claims and the debate over naturalism vs. non-naturalism; Moore's Principia Ethica
Domain-specific¶
- Is-Ought Problem
- and should be distinguished from G. E. Moore's naturalistic fallacy (1903), which is the distinct claim that "good" cannot be defined in terms of any natural property (the open-question argument)
This sourceNames the naturalistic fallacy as the mistake of attempting to define goodness, with 'good' unanalysable and not a natural or metaphysical predicate, and gives the open-question argument of section 13.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
“This view I propose to call the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ and of it I shall now endeavour to dispose.”
- and should be distinguished from G. E. Moore's naturalistic fallacy (1903), which is the distinct claim that "good" cannot be defined in terms of any natural property (the open-question argument)
- Naturalistic Fallacy
- The naturalistic fallacy (G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, 1903) is the metaethical error of identifying the normative property goodness with some natural or descriptive property — the pleasurable, the desired, the evolutionarily fit, the biologically typical, the traditional — so that the normative question is treated as settled once the descriptive facts are established
This sourceMoore names the fallacy and illustrates it with pleasure, desire, the normal and the 'more evolved'; the book does not use 'the traditional' as an example. Moore's Principia Ethica examining the hedonist identifications of good with pleasure and with what is desired as its instances of the naturalistic fallacy. States Moore's open-question argument: because 'is pleasure good?' remains open, and the same for every proposed natural property, good cannot be identical with any of them.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
“BY GEORGE EDWARD MOORE”
- The naturalistic fallacy (G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, 1903) is the metaethical error of identifying the normative property goodness with some natural or descriptive property — the pleasurable, the desired, the evolutionarily fit, the biologically typical, the traditional — so that the normative question is treated as settled once the descriptive facts are established
Verification¶
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