A Theory of Justice¶
Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press.
Cited by¶
15 citations across 15 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Consent
This sourceDevelops hypothetical contractualism: principles of justice are those rational agents would consent to from the original position behind a veil of ignorance — the canonical basis for hypothetical (as opposed to actual or tacit) consent. (Bibliography only — link added.)
- Distributional Effects
- This is the prime's central claim made arithmetic — the scalar is one projection, and a different aggregation rule (the minimax/Rawlsian rule, \(\min_g a_g\)) selects a different "best" model from the same vector, exposing the disparity the mean hides.
This sourceSource of the difference principle / maximin rule that weights the worst-off, contrasted with utilitarian aggregation. (Print monograph, ISBN 0-674-88010-2.)
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
Rawls's own abstract supplies only the frame — a non-utilitarian alternative that will not override the worst-off; it never states the maximin rule, and says nothing about picking a "best" model from a vector.
“John Rawls aims to express an essential part of the common core of the democratic tradition—justice as fairness—and to provide an alternative to utilitarianism, which had dominated the Anglo-Saxon tradition of political thought since the nineteenth century.”
- This is the prime's central claim made arithmetic — the scalar is one projection, and a different aggregation rule (the minimax/Rawlsian rule, \(\min_g a_g\)) selects a different "best" model from the same vector, exposing the disparity the mean hides.
- Equity
- The rule is presumed just and efficient in the common case, much as Rawls (1971) characterizes the role of public principles of justice as default constraints on the basic structure of society.
This sourceTreats principles of justice as constraints on the basic structure — the major institutions distributing rights, duties, and the gains of cooperation — and distinguishes perfect, imperfect, and pure procedural justice.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
The publisher's abstract shows A Theory of Justice treats justice as fairness and citizens' basic rights and liberties, but it nowhere says principles of justice are default constraints on the basic structure.
“Rawls substitutes the ideal of the social contract as a more satisfactory account of the basic rights and liberties of citizens as free and equal persons.”
- The rule is presumed just and efficient in the common case, much as Rawls (1971) characterizes the role of public principles of justice as default constraints on the basic structure of society.
- Fairness
- Fairness bridges formal definitions (rules applied consistently across comparable cases) and intuitive judgments (outcomes that respect legitimate desert, need, or capability).
This sourceDevelops 'justice as fairness': the two principles (equal basic liberties; the difference principle, with inequalities permitted only if they benefit the least advantaged) that free and equal persons would choose from the original position behind a veil of ignorance; distinguishes perfect, imperfect, and pure procedural justice.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
Rawls's abstract shows 'justice as fairness' grounded in principles free and equal persons would accept, but says nothing about the claim's second half — intuitive judgments of desert, need, or capability.
“John Rawls aims to express an essential part of the common core of the democratic tradition—justice as fairness—and to provide an alternative to utilitarianism, which had dominated the Anglo-Saxon tradition of political thought since the nineteenth century. Rawls substitutes the ideal of the social contract as a more satisfactory account of the basic rights and liberties of citizens as free and equal persons.”
- Fairness bridges formal definitions (rules applied consistently across comparable cases) and intuitive judgments (outcomes that respect legitimate desert, need, or capability).
- Impartiality
- Ethics and political philosophy: Rawls's (1971) veil of ignorance — principles of justice chosen without knowing which party one will be — operationalizes impartiality as a structural design constraint on the choice situation, ensuring that the principles selected cannot depend on the chooser's particular identity.
This sourceDistinguishes perfect, imperfect, and pure procedural justice: pure procedural justice obtains when there is no independent criterion for the right outcome and a fair procedure determines what counts as just; central philosophical foundation for the claim that legitimacy can derive from process irrespective of outcome.
- Ethics and political philosophy: Rawls's (1971) veil of ignorance — principles of justice chosen without knowing which party one will be — operationalizes impartiality as a structural design constraint on the choice situation, ensuring that the principles selected cannot depend on the chooser's particular identity.
- Other-Regarding Preferences
- … other-regarding components changes truth-revelation properties, optimal bid functions, and welfare bounds), in political philosophy (any theory evaluating distributions across persons presupposes preferences over distributions, with the veil of ignorance a procedural way of eliciting other-regarding components
This sourceThe veil of ignorance as a procedural device for eliciting other-regarding components of distributive preference.
- … other-regarding components changes truth-revelation properties, optimal bid functions, and welfare bounds), in political philosophy (any theory evaluating distributions across persons presupposes preferences over distributions, with the veil of ignorance a procedural way of eliciting other-regarding components
- Preference Heterogeneity and Conflict
- Fairness mechanisms (proportional representation, random assignment, needs-based allocation) may be deployed to resolve preference conflicts, but fairness is a normative principle, while preference heterogeneity is a structural fact, a normative-versus-structural distinction Rawls (1971) develops in his theory of justice as fairness.
This sourceDistinguishes perfect, imperfect, and pure procedural justice: pure procedural justice obtains when there is no independent criterion for the right outcome and a fair procedure determines what counts as just; central philosophical foundation for the claim that legitimacy can derive from process irrespective of outcome.
- Fairness mechanisms (proportional representation, random assignment, needs-based allocation) may be deployed to resolve preference conflicts, but fairness is a normative principle, while preference heterogeneity is a structural fact, a normative-versus-structural distinction Rawls (1971) develops in his theory of justice as fairness.
- Procedural Fairness (Due Process)
- Rawls (1971), in A Theory of Justice, classifies this insight as "pure procedural justice," where outcomes derive their legitimacy from following a publicly justifiable procedure rather than from independent verification of the result.
This sourceDistinguishes perfect, imperfect, and pure procedural justice: pure procedural justice obtains when there is no independent criterion for the right outcome and a fair procedure determines what counts as just; central philosophical foundation for the claim that legitimacy can derive from process irrespective of outcome.
- Rawls (1971), in A Theory of Justice, classifies this insight as "pure procedural justice," where outcomes derive their legitimacy from following a publicly justifiable procedure rather than from independent verification of the result.
- Rights vs. Freedoms
This sourceDistinguishes perfect, imperfect, and pure procedural justice: pure procedural justice obtains when there is no independent criterion for the right outcome and a fair procedure determines what counts as just; central philosophical foundation for the claim that legitimacy can derive from process irrespective of outcome.
Mechanisms¶
- Duty-Priority and Harm Comparison
- It resembles a lexical priority
This sourceDefines lexical priority as ranking a prior principle so that gains under a lower-ranked principle cannot compensate for breaching it.
- It resembles a lexical priority
- Equity Guardrail Test
- Its strength is that it prevents rights and floors from being balanced away by aggregate gains: it encodes a maximin-style priority to the worst-off,
This sourceRawls gives basic liberties priority over aggregate gains and uses maximin reasoning to protect the least advantaged.
- Its strength is that it prevents rights and floors from being balanced away by aggregate gains: it encodes a maximin-style priority to the worst-off,
- Priority Classification and Tie-Break Protocol
- The design leans on lexical priority — ordering principles so that higher ones are fully satisfied before lower ones are considered
This sourceUses lexical ordering to give prior principles precedence over later principles rather than blending them into a single trade-off.
- The design leans on lexical priority — ordering principles so that higher ones are fully satisfied before lower ones are considered
- Ranking Stability Report
- The guarding discipline is to state the range the stability claim covers, and to read robustness as decision durability, never as validation of the underlying weights — the legitimacy verdict here follows Rawlsian procedural fairness
This sourceExplains Rawls's pure procedural justice as fairness supplied by a fair procedure rather than by an independent criterion for the resulting outcome.
- The guarding discipline is to state the range the stability claim covers, and to read robustness as decision durability, never as validation of the underlying weights — the legitimacy verdict here follows Rawlsian procedural fairness
- Rights-Floor and Sufficiency Gate
- The guarding discipline is to keep the floor list short, expensive to expand, and anchored to genuinely nontradeable minima, honoring lexical priority
This sourceGives equal basic liberties lexical priority, preventing their sacrifice for gains governed by lower-priority principles.
- The guarding discipline is to keep the floor list short, expensive to expand, and anchored to genuinely nontradeable minima, honoring lexical priority
- Side-Swap Test
- It is the practical cousin of judging an arrangement from behind a veil of ignorance — deciding as if you did not know which side you would land on.
This sourceDefines the veil of ignorance as choosing principles without knowing one's eventual social position or natural advantages.
- It is the practical cousin of judging an arrangement from behind a veil of ignorance — deciding as if you did not know which side you would land on.
Verification¶
Does it exist? Confirmed. This work's DOI resolves to a registered record, which fixes its identity. That is all it fixes.
Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 3 of 15 citations: 3 supported in part. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.
Was it audited? Yes. A second, independent pass read the citation against the article text and recorded a verdict.
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Links previously used in the corpus¶
Before the registry existed this work was also linked 4 other ways.
- https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674042605 ×2
- https://search.worldcat.org/title/theory-of-justice/oclc/00216912 ×2
- https://books.google.com/books?id=kvpby7HtAe0C ×1
- https://search.worldcat.org/title/277674 ×1
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