A Theory of Justice¶
Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Belknap Press.
Cited by¶
10 citations across 10 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Consent
This sourceDevelops hypothetical contractualism: principles of justice are those rational agents would consent to from the original position behind a veil of ignorance — the canonical basis for hypothetical (as opposed to actual or tacit) consent. (Bibliography only — link added.)
- Distributional Effects
- This is the prime's central claim made arithmetic — the scalar is one projection, and a different aggregation rule (the minimax/Rawlsian rule, \(\min_g a_g\)) selects a different "best" model from the same vector, exposing the disparity the mean hides.
This sourceSource of the difference principle / maximin rule that weights the worst-off, contrasted with utilitarian aggregation. (Print monograph, ISBN 0-674-88010-2.)
- This is the prime's central claim made arithmetic — the scalar is one projection, and a different aggregation rule (the minimax/Rawlsian rule, \(\min_g a_g\)) selects a different "best" model from the same vector, exposing the disparity the mean hides.
- Equity
- The rule is presumed just and efficient in the common case, much as Rawls (1971) characterizes the role of public principles of justice as default constraints on the basic structure of society.
This sourceTreats principles of justice as constraints on the basic structure — the major institutions distributing rights, duties, and the gains of cooperation — and distinguishes perfect, imperfect, and pure procedural justice.
- The rule is presumed just and efficient in the common case, much as Rawls (1971) characterizes the role of public principles of justice as default constraints on the basic structure of society.
- Fairness
- Fairness bridges formal definitions (rules applied consistently across comparable cases) and intuitive judgments (outcomes that respect legitimate desert, need, or capability).
This sourceDevelops 'justice as fairness': the two principles (equal basic liberties; the difference principle, with inequalities permitted only if they benefit the least advantaged) that free and equal persons would choose from the original position behind a veil of ignorance; distinguishes perfect, imperfect, and pure procedural justice.
- Fairness bridges formal definitions (rules applied consistently across comparable cases) and intuitive judgments (outcomes that respect legitimate desert, need, or capability).
- Impartiality
- Ethics and political philosophy: Rawls's (1971) veil of ignorance — principles of justice chosen without knowing which party one will be — operationalizes impartiality as a structural design constraint on the choice situation, ensuring that the principles selected cannot depend on the chooser's particular identity.
This sourceDistinguishes perfect, imperfect, and pure procedural justice: pure procedural justice obtains when there is no independent criterion for the right outcome and a fair procedure determines what counts as just; central philosophical foundation for the claim that legitimacy can derive from process irrespective of outcome.
- Ethics and political philosophy: Rawls's (1971) veil of ignorance — principles of justice chosen without knowing which party one will be — operationalizes impartiality as a structural design constraint on the choice situation, ensuring that the principles selected cannot depend on the chooser's particular identity.
- Other-Regarding Preferences
- … other-regarding components changes truth-revelation properties, optimal bid functions, and welfare bounds), in political philosophy (any theory evaluating distributions across persons presupposes preferences over distributions, with the veil of ignorance a procedural way of eliciting other-regarding components
This sourceThe veil of ignorance as a procedural device for eliciting other-regarding components of distributive preference.
- … other-regarding components changes truth-revelation properties, optimal bid functions, and welfare bounds), in political philosophy (any theory evaluating distributions across persons presupposes preferences over distributions, with the veil of ignorance a procedural way of eliciting other-regarding components
- Preference Heterogeneity and Conflict
- Fairness mechanisms (proportional representation, random assignment, needs-based allocation) may be deployed to resolve preference conflicts, but fairness is a normative principle, while preference heterogeneity is a structural fact, a normative-versus-structural distinction Rawls (1971) develops in his theory of justice as fairness.
This sourceDistinguishes perfect, imperfect, and pure procedural justice: pure procedural justice obtains when there is no independent criterion for the right outcome and a fair procedure determines what counts as just; central philosophical foundation for the claim that legitimacy can derive from process irrespective of outcome.
- Fairness mechanisms (proportional representation, random assignment, needs-based allocation) may be deployed to resolve preference conflicts, but fairness is a normative principle, while preference heterogeneity is a structural fact, a normative-versus-structural distinction Rawls (1971) develops in his theory of justice as fairness.
- Procedural Fairness (Due Process)
- Rawls (1971), in A Theory of Justice, classifies this insight as "pure procedural justice," where outcomes derive their legitimacy from following a publicly justifiable procedure rather than from independent verification of the result.
This sourceDistinguishes perfect, imperfect, and pure procedural justice: pure procedural justice obtains when there is no independent criterion for the right outcome and a fair procedure determines what counts as just; central philosophical foundation for the claim that legitimacy can derive from process irrespective of outcome.
- Rawls (1971), in A Theory of Justice, classifies this insight as "pure procedural justice," where outcomes derive their legitimacy from following a publicly justifiable procedure rather than from independent verification of the result.
- Rights vs. Freedoms
This sourceDistinguishes perfect, imperfect, and pure procedural justice: pure procedural justice obtains when there is no independent criterion for the right outcome and a fair procedure determines what counts as just; central philosophical foundation for the claim that legitimacy can derive from process irrespective of outcome.
Mechanisms¶
- Priority Classification and Tie-Break Protocol
- The design leans on lexical priority — ordering principles so that higher ones are fully satisfied before lower ones are considered
This sourceUses lexical ordering to give prior principles precedence over later principles rather than blending them into a single trade-off.
- The design leans on lexical priority — ordering principles so that higher ones are fully satisfied before lower ones are considered
Verification¶
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